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A Science-industry study of the Distribution of Fishing Benefits to the 
Community of Grand Manan, Bay of Fundy  
By 
Daniel R. Mombourquette 
Abstract 
 
To assess the state of Canadian fisheries, it is important to measure how benefits are 
distributed within, and across fishing communities and how this changes over time. I 
collaborated with government and industry members to identify and examine a suitable 
set of social and economic indicators that can satisfy this objective. Examining Grand 
Manan, New Brunswick, and communities in the Maritimes Region of Atlantic Canada, I 
tested the indicators using quantitative and qualitative methods. The quantitative 
methods included proportional trend, Lorenz Curve, Gini Coefficient, and spatial 
analyses. I collected qualitative data from participants who were knowledgeable of 
Grand Manan fisheries. I analyzed three case fisheries (lobster, herring purse seine, and 
mobile groundfish) for comparison based on: reports of changing distribution of 
community benefits, data availability, and the ability to interview knowledgeable 
participants. The results revealed that there was increasing unevenness in the 
distribution of benefits among and across communities, over time. Survey data 
documented a series of factors (e.g. resource scarcity, financial unviability, asset 
transferability, and a short-sighted management regime) which are driving the widening 
unevenness and reinforcing negative community effects. This research has the potential 
to guide future efforts which aim to understand distribution of benefits in fisheries, 
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AHMC – Atlantic Herring Management Committee 
AHFMC – Atlantic Herring Fishermen’s Marketing Co-operative  
Benefits – Provide advantages – stable or net positive gains – to the communities and sectors 
examined (Schuhbauer, Sumaila, & Chuenpagdee, 2015). 
CFRN – Canadian Fisheries Research Network  
CL – Carapace Length 
Fishing Community – Is bounded by: the human population within a community spatial scale, the 
geographic area fished by community members, the institutions which govern the fishing 
activities of these people, and their unique social and economic characteristics (Boyd & Charles, 
2006). 
Distribution – The extent to which different “components” of society have (access to or 
ownership of) different “units” (Coulter, 1989). 
DFO – Fisheries and Oceans Canada 
EEZ – Exclusive Economic Zone 
EAF – Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries 
Equity – A normative set standard in which the level of inequality is determined to be fair 
(Coulter, 1989).  
Fleet Separation Provision – Precludes the corporate ownership of ‘new’ licenses for <65ft 
vessels (DFO, 2003). 
GMFA – Grand Manan Fishermen’s Association  
ICNAF – International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries 
Inequality – The variation (i.e. unevenness) across the distribution examined and that “variation 
is the changing form, condition, or substance from a former or usual state or from an assumed 
standard” (Coulter, 1989). 
ITQ – Individual Transferable Quota 
IQ – Individual Quota 
LFA – Lobster Fishing Area 
NAFO – Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization  




PIIFCAF – Preservation of the Independence of the Inshore Fleet in Canada’s Atlantic Fisheries  
SES – Social-Ecological System 
TAC – Total Allowable Catch 
Trust Agreement – The beneficial interest of a license is held in ‘trust’ between a financing entity 
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Chapter 1: Introduction   
   
Research motivation and objective 
 
 
Fisheries systems are inherently complex social-ecological systems (SESs) where human 
systems of society, economics, and governance are coupled within ecological systems. 
Fisheries stock collapses have contributed to negative effects throughout the societies 
and economies that rely on these fisheries resources. Although the reports cite over-
exploitation as the principal driver of resource scarcity, the literature also criticizes 
conventional regimes for their assessment and management of these resources, which 
have contributed to social-ecological change in fisheries systems (Stephenson, et al., 
2018; Berkes et al., 2014; Barnett, 2014; Garcia, Rice, & Charles, 2014; Paterson & 
Kainge, 2014; Charles, 2013; FAO; 2009; Ostrom, 2009; Lui et al., 2007; Wilson, 2006; 
Hughes et al. 2005; Berkes, Folke & Colding, 1998).  
 
The conventional fisheries management paradigm has been based on a single-species 
productivity model, which only incorporates a narrow suite of scientific data on catches 
and populations. Within the last few decades, the Food and Agriculture Organization of 
the United Nations (FAO) and others have challenged the conventional paradigm for its 
“poor performance” and have repeatedly called for a holistic ecosystem approach to 
fisheries (EAF). Proponents argue that an EAF offers a new management paradigm which 




economic analysis, including equity and fairness (the manner in which coastal 
communities are impacted by the distribution of net benefits). EAF proponents point out 
that social and economic, and, in particular, equity and fairness aspects have been 
ignored in conventional fisheries management. They emphasize that to move towards 
an EAF will require an integration of scientific, local, and traditional knowledge, using 
quantitative and qualitative analyses, with broad stakeholder participation. To 
accomplish this, an EAF will require a rigorous monitoring system of indicators which are 
(in part) contextualized based on policy objective outcomes (Stephenson, et al., 2018; 
Angel, et al., 2014; Barnett, 2014; Charles, 2014; Garcia, Rice, & Charles, 2014; de Young, 
Charles , & Hjort, 2008; Paterson & Kainge, 2014; Charles, 2013; Berkes & Ross, 2012; 
Long, 2012; FAO; 2009; Boyd & Charles, 2006).             
 
I aim to contribute to the understanding of fisheries SESs through the lens of social and 
economic dynamics and aspects of EAF management objectives of equity and fairness, 
which are often overlooked. Coulter (1989) wrote that equity is a standard level of 
distributional unevenness which is determined to be fair. However, Haas (2014) 
explained that there is no standard measure of equity within the current Canadian 
fisheries management paradigm. Consequently, I explore the dynamics concerning the 
distribution of net fishing benefits and the extent of unevenness within coastal 
communities, which would be assumed to be important to policy objectives and 
management under an EAF. Furthermore, I analyze three case fisheries in the 




sector regarding changing distribution of benefits. According to this industry group, 
Grand Manan fishery trends mirror those reported internationally – as an implication of 
declining resources and failed ecological policy objectives, the community experienced a 
net loss of benefits, over time, which has reinforced other negative community effects.  
 
A longitudinal study by Marshall (2009) used a primarily qualitative approach to record 
the change to Grand Manan fisheries. At the onset of the study in 1995, she described 
the community as vibrant and diverse with traditional fishing industries that provided 
the foundation for the island’s cultural identity and resilience. In later years, she 
documented that the community was negatively impacted by declining fisheries 
resources which created a downturn throughout the social economy. Her findings 
reaffirm global literature sources and she wrote that these dynamics triggered the 
erosion of the community’s resilience. Furthermore, Marshall argued that cumulative 
constraints ‘contributed to fissures within the community’, which resulted in growing 
income disparity and increased barriers to fisheries access for new entrants (Marshall, 
2009).    
Research objective, scope and organization 
 
I examine the changing distribution of net fishing benefits to the community of Grand 
Manan as an assessment of EAF policy objectives of equity and fairness. Based on the 
reports of changing distribution, I evaluate the community’s lobster, herring purse seine, 




literature and policy context regarding the need for this assessment, in chapter 2. I 
review literature on distribution to form the basis of my analysis. I use accepted 
approaches for indicator development to analyze existing global frameworks to develop 
a suite of indicators, which are relevant to this research. The process includes 
collaborating with academic, industry, and government partners to help conceptualize 
the research objectives, scope, and knowledge (local and scientific) availability. 
 
In chapter 3, I test the utility of a suite of indicators on the Grand Manan case fisheries. I 
examine the distribution of community benefits with mixed quantitative and qualitative 
approaches. I compare the indicator results of several methodologies and analyze the 
efficacy of each to measure local-scale distribution of benefits. Recognizing that fisheries 
function across multiple geographic scales, I incorporate an assessment which explores 
these cross-scale connections regionally. Moreover, I use a foundation of indicator 
development, and collaborative research approaches to examine the broader 
implications of changing distribution of community benefits.  
 
The goal of my research is to answer a series of questions. Firstly, what is the extent of 
changing distribution of benefits within the Grand Manan case fisheries? Using the suite 
of indicators I compare the past distribution to that of the recent distribution of 
benefits. It is also important to know what knowledge sources are available. 
Furthermore, is collaboration with members of the fishery a useful tool in examining 




and research efforts? In chapter 4, I summarize key insights from chapters 2, and 3, in 
context of these thesis questions. I contrast the questions I answered against the 






















Chapter 2: Selecting Indicators to Measure Distribution of Fishing Benefits 






Beginning in the 1990s, the Canadian federal government made incremental changes 
towards an Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries (EAF). The EAF efforts included 
participation in various international agreements (under the auspices of the FAO) by the 
Canadian government and its Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) agency, as well as 
implementing integrated fisheries management plans (IFMPs). The aim of IFMPs was to 
provide a framework for evaluating fisheries social-ecologic systems (SESs). However, 
DFO has criticized its own implementation of the EAF, stating that many fisheries have 
outdated IFMPs, or none at all (DFO, 2013a). In 2011, the Auditor General’s Report 
(Report of the Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development – A 
Study of Managing Fisheries for Sustainability) also criticized Canadian governments 
(specifically, federally and provincially) and their management agencies for not 
considering all fisheries systems dynamics, especially social and economic components. 
The report stressed the importance of community scale and distributional equity.  
 
In 2010, the Canadian Fisheries Research Network was established by a national group 
from academia, industry, and government to enhance collaborative research on several 




academics, industry stakeholders, and government officials to define a Comprehensive 
Fisheries Sustainability Framework (hereafter referred to as the CFRN Framework - Table 
1; Appendix A). Within the framework’s social and economic domain and equity and 
fairness dimension, the collaborators also emphasize the importance of evaluating 
community level impacts and the distribution of benefits (Stephenson, et al., 2018; 
Angel, et. al., 2014). These elements are derived from the following Canadian and 
international EAF equity and fairness policy objectives: 
 
- “Access to the fishery is allocated equitably and predictably among the 
interested parties” (Auditor General of Canada, 2011). 
- “Intergenerational equity (i.e. ensuring fairness in allocation and use of resources 
between generations) and intragenerational equity (i.e. ensuring fairness in 
allocation and use of resources within the current generation) are central to the 
concept of sustainable fisheries management and should thus be key principles 
guiding efforts to move toward more responsible approaches to fisheries 
management through EAF” (FAO, 2009).   
- “Ensure that the benefits of fishing licenses flow to the fish harvester and the 













These three EAF policy objectives are examined under the equity and fairness dimension 
of the CFRN framework, which are defined by the following elements: 
 
 
In the context of analyzing the distribution of fisheries benefits to Grand Manan, I 
examine the distribution of resource quantities (i.e. allocations), access, and other 
benefits among harvester groups and communities, and whether this remains stable or 
becomes more or less equal over time. Examining and developing such measures based 
on these contexts provides information on the functionality of the fisheries systems 
examined, and the driving factors of distributional change. Barnett (2018) and others 
highlight that the full assessment and consideration of distribution of benefits to fishing 
communities is often disregarded; thus, making it difficult to monitor distributional 
effects with insufficient data sets (Barnett, 2018; Copes & Charles, 2004; McCay, 1996). 
Accordingly, this research was motivated by these key deficiencies in fisheries 





Indicator Selection Approaches 
 
The reviewed literature provides guidance on the process of fishery indicator 
development. This guidance explains the necessary steps to develop indicators which 
reflect the objectives being evaluated (termed the evaluand) (Edwards, 2008). Although 
the literature varies on the number of steps required in the process to develop project-
specific indicators, the content of the guidance is similar. Initially, the indicator 
development process must (1) define the subjects and boundaries of the system to be 
assessed, (2) develop the evaluand to reflect the agreed-upon policy objectives being 
used and meet the needs of relevant users (i.e. industry stakeholders, academics, or 
government members). Edwards (2008) states that the evaluand should be developed 
collaboratively with an identified group of relevant users who wish to participate in the 
indicator selection process. Collaborative processes often empower all contributors by 
enhancing participant communication, trust, confidence, and beneficial social networks 
(i.e. social capital), along with strengthening the scientific robustness of the project’s 
design (Yochum, Starr, & Wendt, 2011; Wiber, Charles, Kearney, & Berkes, 2009).  
 
Boyd and Charles (2006) recommend compiling a comprehensive set of candidate 
indicators. Since it is not practical to report on all candidate indicators, the set should be 
reduced using screening criteria (Rice & Rochet, 2005). Also, since there is no universal 
number of indicators or criteria to define their selection, I itemize a generic overview of 
indicator selection criteria used in previous studies. Moreover, Edwards (2008) ensured 




to this thesis, selected indicators must adhere to the subject definitions of distribution, 
benefits, and community. Boyd and Charles (2006) define a fishing community as one 
that is bounded by: the human population within a community spatial scale, the 
geographic area fished by community members, the institutions which govern the 
fishing activities of these people, and their unique social and economic characteristics.  
 
Additionally, Edwards (2008) screened indicators based on data availability – they 
examined the underlying attributes or metric options which provide the analytical basis 
for each indicator. She argued that indicator data must be: appropriate in temporal 
scale, scientifically valid, accurate and precise, adequately documented, current, directly 
measurable, acceptable in spatial scale and consistent in scope, quality, currency, scale 
and sampling methods.  Furthermore, indicator data shall be practical and screened 
accordingly. Practicality is based on the feasibility (in time, space, and financial 
resources) for investigators to properly monitor, analyze and report on the indicators. 
Indicators are highly practical and pass this level of scrutiny if data are readily available 
and easily interpreted at the scale of the fishing community (Edwards, 2008).  
 
Lastly, the indicator selection process should be iterative and continually evolving based 
on new information and research demands from the literature, industry experts, 
research collaborators, and governing institutions. The final stage involves reporting on 




retrospective analysis of the indicator selection process and offers insights for future 




I used an analytical and iterative 6-step process (Box 2), based on the contexts of 
approaches in the literature, to select indicators which can assess the changing 
distribution of fishing benefits to the community of Grand Manan. Consequently, the 
selected suite of indicators functions to assess the outcomes of the EAF equity and 
fairness policy objectives – by evaluating  how fishing benefits are  distributed across 
coastal communities, participants, and generations, over time. The following steps draw 
on the theoretical bases of social-ecological systems, distribution, indicator selection, 






In step 1, a thesis co-construction committee consisted of myself, my supervisors, and a 
network facilitator, and functioned as a formal arrangement between SMU and the 
CFRN. In discussions with the thesis co-construction committee, I identified collaborative 
research partners from the Grand Manan Fishermen’s Association (GMFA; representing 




knowledge of Grand Manan fisheries. This knowledge informed the research scope – the 
collaborators alleged that the three case fisheries display increasing disparity, the cases 
would enable cross-comparison, and data are available.     
 
In step 2, I developed the thesis objective through a process of co-construction with my 
supervisors and a CFRN network facilitator. I reviewed fisheries policy, the literature, 
and derived the thesis objective to explore the subjects of distribution of community 
fishing benefits, which is ignored in current policy and identified as an industry research 
need. I searched the policies and literature using the following key words, and various 
key word combinations: socioeconomics, indicators, fisheries, distribution, benefits, 
equity, inequality, inequity, sociology, social impact assessment, fisheries management, 
sustainable fisheries, economics, ecosystem approach to fisheries, property rights, 
integrated fisheries management plans (for lobster, herring, and groundfish in Atlantic 
Canada), and DFO licensing policies. I subsequently researched the literature based on 
the thesis key words, which inevitably led me to research additional topics related to the 
distribution of community fishing benefits.  
 
There is no consensus (in policy and the literature) regarding the number of indicators 
required to assess the distribution of fisheries benefits. Thus, I aggregated indicators at 
the higher domain level. Since distribution theory is rooted within the social and 
economic domain, I aggregated candidate indicators to consider all factors affecting 
fisheries performance within this domain. 




In step 3, I derived the candidate indicators from global fisheries frameworks found 
within the literature. I selected the frameworks on the premise that they included 
indicators which analyze the social and economic domain. The aggregation reached a 
saturation point at 13 global indicator sources – where the global sources did not reveal 
any new information regarding social and economic indicators (Mason, 2010). I 
reference all indicators to their corresponding frameworks. 
 
In step 4, I scanned the CFRN Framework, and its attributes list, to find the location of 
each candidate indicator. I then organized the candidate indicators by their relevant 
connection to the dimensions and elements of the CFRN framework (Tables 2-7). 
Although 9 indicators are missing from the CFRN framework, I related each to the 
dimensions and elements which fit best. For example, I linked employment per landed 
weight and employment per landed value (Charles, et al., 2002) to the equitable 
distribution of benefits and costs, the sustainability of livelihoods (elements), and the 
equity and fairness (dimension). The former two indicators relate to labour which falls 
under the latter elements and dimension.      
 
I further screened the candidate indicators against the selection criteria (below). 
Edwards (2008) describes that indicators shall be selected based on criteria that pertain 
to the research objectives and requirements. Thus, I screen the indicators in terms of 
their usefulness to measure the distribution of fishing benefits to community with 




I excluded any indicator that did not explicitly meet the parameters of the criteria. For 
ease of analysis, I did not explore the development potential of indicators which did not 
meet these strict criteria. For inclusion into the final set, indicators (i.e. appropriate for 
testing) must explicitly measure and reflect the EAF equity and fairness objectives as 
they pertain to distribution (particularly change in disparity), assessment of benefits, 
community specificity, and data requirements. 
 
Distribution theory examines the sharing of units between components within the 
human dimension (Coulter, 1989). Thus, I screened the candidate indicators and their 
metrics against their ability to evaluate distribution by Coulter’s (1989) definition. Also, 
since one policy objective references measuring distribution across generations, 
indicator data must be able to assess distribution through time.   
 
I also evaluated the capacity of the candidate indicators and fundamental data to 
measure the distribution of beneficial ‘units’ across the fishing community(ies) and 
sectors in the research scope. Fishing benefits must provide advantages – stable or net 
positive gains – to the communities and sectors examined (Schuhbauer, Sumaila, & 
Chuenpagdee, 2015). 
 
The underlying metric data supporting the candidate indicators must also reflect the 
scale of the human community I examined - given the population, the geographic 




scale, and social and economic structure (Boyd & Charles, 2006). Available institutional 
data bounds the municipality of Grand Manan as the main island and its comprised 
townships (excluding the extended archipelago; Figure 1). Local harvesters exploit 
species throughout the Maritimes Region [NAFO areas 4VWX5Y, and Lobster Fishing 
Areas (LFAs) 38 and 38B] and DFO manages fishing activities. Additionally, by recognizing 
geographic connectivity and the overlapping resource use by multiple communities, I 
considered the availability of community-specific indicator data for adjacent 
communities to explore cross-scale linkages with Grand Manan.  
 
 
Figure 1. Maritimes regional map with inset Grand Manan map (DFO, 2014a; Marshall, 2009). 
 
I assessed the candidate indicators against the knowledge sources available for the case 
fisheries in Grand Manan. The process included examining the potential to collect data 




sources. The GMFA collaborators helped identify the capacity to collect primary LK data, 
through a series of iterative discussions. 
Also, during this process, the research collaborators helped to assess whether the 
indicators are relevant to their needs as stakeholders and understandable to the local 
knowledge holders they represent.      
 
Examining the existing secondary datasets, I consulted the institutional databases of 
DFO, Statistics Canada, Transport Canada, and the Municipality of Grand Manan. I also 
assessed the practicality to collected data by considering the constraints of the research 
scope. 
 
In step 5, I separated the candidate indicators into 6 tables (below) by the following 
reoccurring social and economic themes (which frequented the discussions and 
readings): 
 
 Fisheries access – indicators evaluating the types of physical capital required to 
access a fishery (i.e. licenses and/or quota)  
 
 Capital inputs – indicators which evaluate fishing effort and input investments 
 
 Labour – indicators relating to human capital inputs and characteristics   
 
 Capital flows at the enterprise scale – indicators which assess the economic 
activity of businesses (i.e. monetary outputs and other transactions)  
 
 Financial information – indicators which examine the monetary outputs and 
exchanges at the scale of individuals   
 
 Others category - social and economic indicators which do not fall within the 





Lastly in step 6, I report on the indicator selection process, discuss positive outcomes, 
and critique constraints. I offer insights regarding the process and explore the needs for 




In step 3, the candidate aggregation revealed 42 social and economic indicators that 
exist within the 14 framework sources examined, with varying frequency. The 14 global 
sources of indicator literature revealed two indicators associated with fisheries access 
(Table 2). I selected the ‘number of licenses’ indicator as appropriate for testing as it met 
all screening criteria (as described in step 4 under methods above). Archival data are 
readily available for the community of Grand Manan and case fisheries. According to the 
GMFA collaborators, local knowledge holders have a deep understanding of fisheries 
licenses and their distribution patterns spanning decades. Licenses provide fisheries 
access, which yields benefits to society (in the form of revenue, livelihoods, etc.). 
Furthermore, distribution can either be expressed quantitatively (e.g. proportional 
trend, charts, maps, Lorenz Curves, etc.) or qualitatively such as by the perception of 
trends (e.g. relative changes to the number of licenses held within each Grand Manan 
fishery, over time). I rejected the quota indicator because I would not be able to assess 


















Table 3 displays three indicators, which several authors categorized as capital inputs 
(MRAG Americas, 2014; Charles, 2005; Schirmer & Pickworth, 2005; Copes & Charles, 
2004; Bonzon, 2000; FAO, 1999). The number of vessels indicator met all screening 
                                                          
 
1Angel et al., 2014 
2Dayarathe & Sivakumaran, 1994  
3GPCE, 2006 
4Raymond, 1985 
5Charles et al., 2002 
6MRAG Americas, 2014 
7FAO, 1999 
8Boyd & Charles, 2006 
9DFO, 2011a 
10Pollnac et al., 2006 
11Seung & Zhang, 2011 
12Schirmer & Casey, 2005 






















Selected for Testing 
Number of licenses (Δ in access) 
1,4, 5, 6, 12, 13
 
In limited entry fisheries, harvesters and firms require fishing licenses 
to gain access to the fisheries (e.g. commercial, recreational, or 
ceremonial) (DFO, 1996). Licenses enable individuals (license holders 
and/or employees), firms, and economies, at all scales to gain many 
benefits. Licenses afford license holders to gain revenue, income, 
they provide employment to employees, generate multipliers 
throughout the economy, and bolster cultural livelihoods. Therefore, 
licenses act as an overarching benefit to society (Gough, 2007; 
Edwards et al., 2006; Copes & Charles, 2004). 
Excluded from Testing 
Distribution of quota 
1, 6, 7, 12
 
This indicator measures the unevenness that exists between 
allocations of catch shares to individuals (e.g. individual quota), 
groups (e.g. community quotas), or firms (e.g. enterprise allocations) 




criteria; thus, it is useable for further testing. The collaborators stated that potential 
interviewees could easily and accurately describe changing vessel numbers and 
distribution amongst the case fisheries in Grand Manan. Although Transport Canada has 
maintained a vessel registry for decades, the agency does not pair the data to the 
vessel’s fishery, making it difficult to interpret. Consequently, I do not use the archival 
vessel data in chapter 3.  
 
I examined vessels as a means for fishing communities to generate future benefits, up to 
a certain point. Beyond bio-economic equilibrium, the costs associated with maintaining 
an increasing number of vessels will yield net losses (Panayotou, 1982). Therefore, it is 
important to recognize when the number of vessels in the case fisheries are yielding net 
positive benefits, zero benefits, or net negative benefits (i.e. costs to the fishing 
community).   
 
I rejected the capital investment and vessel capacity indicators since archival data 
collection is sporadic, and analysis would prove difficult. Also, the LK assessment 
revealed that it would be difficult for knowledge holders to describe investments and 




































Selected for Testing 
Number of vessels 
1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 10, 11
 
Vessels are physical capital inputs and necessary for commercial 
fisheries production. Researchers can also use vessel metrics to 
indicate the level of fishing effort (MRAG Americas, 2014; FAO, 1999). 
Although vessels are initial capital costs, I treat them in a positive 
manner as they are investments spent to yield potential future 
benefits (e.g. profits, income, employment, etc.) (Charles, 2005).  
Excluded from Testing 
Capital investment 
1, 2, 7, 10, 13
 
The literature defines capital investment as the measure of the total 
present value component (i.e. capital) of the production process, 
taking into consideration depreciation (Schirmer & Pickworth, 2005; 
Bonzon, 2000; FAO, 1999). This indicator typically refers to the 
money invested in vessels but can also refer to investment in 
processing facilities.  
Vessel capacity 
4, 7, 8, 10
 
Vessel capacity is often a quantification of fish storage volume. 
Vessels with larger fish holds have greater capacity enabling the 
ability to catch larger quantities of fish (i.e. increased catching power) 
(Copes & Charles, 2004; FAO, 1999).  
 
 
Table 4 displays 8 indicators pertaining to labour characteristics. These indicators 
examine the number of people employed in fisheries. Currently, Statistics Canada and 
DFO do not track labour in relation to fisheries, at the community scale. Fortunately, LK 
holders have a strong understanding of employment distribution within the case 
fisheries of Grand Manan, and how employment benefits this community. Thus, I 
selected employment for further analysis on these grounds. I rejected the other labour 
indicators since the collaborators consider these too complex for knowledge holders to 




knowledge holders and institutional databases are unable to provide at the local 
fisheries scale.           
 

























Selected for Testing  
Employment
 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14
  
Many authors define employment as paid labour. With available 
data, the literature typically evaluates the indicator as the number of 
people employed in a social unit or as a rate (percentage of people 
employed in comparison to the total labour force) (Clay, Kitts, & 
Pinto da Silva, 2014; MRAG Americas, 2014; DFO, 2011a; Kitts, et al., 
2011; Schirmer & Casey, 2005; Charles et al., 2002; Bonzon, 2000).  
Excluded from Testing  
Employment diversity 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 12, 13, 14
  
The CFRN framework specifies that analysts can evaluate 
employment diversity, at various scales (including within 
communities), based on multiple attributes (e.g. gender, ethnicity, 
age, etc.) (Angel et al., 2014). The indicator assesses the variety of 
employment options available. Employment diversity is also 
socioeconomically beneficial, as diversity is a main component of 
resilience (Hansen et al., 2015; Berkes & Ross, 2012; Marshall & 
Marshall, 2007; Charles et al., 2002). 
Participation 
1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 13
 
In the fisheries context, participation is (typically) a quantification of 
people actively involved in the fishing industry. Many studies use 
employment and participation indicators interchangeably; however, 
participation may also monitor unpaid workers or volunteers 
(Schirmer & Casey, 2005). 
Unemployment 
1, 3, 4, 7, 9, 12, 13, 14
 
The literature defines unemployment as the number of people 
(within the labour force) that are not working, and analysts typically 
measure it as a rate (percentage of unemployment in relation to the 
total labour force) (GPCE, 2006; FAO, 1999; Raymond, 1985).  
Dependency 
1, 4, 10, 12
 
In the context of this research and the literature, dependency is the 
proportion of fisheries employment in relation to total employment 
(Angel et al., 2014; GPCE, 2006; Schirmer & Casey, 2005; Raymond, 
1985). In 1985, Raymond, and colleagues, compared dependency 
ratios between communities. 
Number of EI claims
 1, 4, 9
 
In the Canadian context, employment insurance (EI) is a government 
wage subsidy; it provides supplemental income, during periods of 
unemployment (DFO, 2011a; Gough, 2007). In 1985, Raymond, and 
colleagues, quantified the distribution of EI beneficiaries, by 
community. Analysts can also measure the number of EI claims as a 




Employment per landed weight 
5
 
This indicator assesses the number of people employed per unit of 
catch. In 2002, Charles and colleagues quantified this indicator by 
metric tonne, at the sub-national (provincial) scale, using a trend 
analysis over 10 years.  
Employment per landed value
 5 
This indicator assesses the number of people employed per unit of 
landed value. Charles (2002) and colleagues quantified this indicator 
per million dollars (CAD) generated by the Nova Scotian (provincial 
scale) fisheries, using a trend analysis over 10 years. 
 
 
Authors regard 15 indicators (Table 5) as useful for examining enterprise capital flows. I 
determined that landed value was ideal for further testing since archival data and LK is 
readily available for the case fisheries in Grand Manan. Although other researchers may 
find catch and price useful to monitor, I categorized these indicators as redundant since 
landed value is a function of catch and price. I rejected all other enterprise capital 
indicators because they would require extensive costs and earnings surveying - which 
was beyond the feasibility of the research scope.       
 











































Selected for Testing 
Landed value (Turnover; T) 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13
 
This indicator is also known as gross revenue or turnover (T) at the 
production level of the value chain; it is the product of a fishery’s 
total landings (typically aggregated annually) and ex-vessel price. 
Landed value is an overarching benefit to society as employment 
income is derived from the revenue. Also, as the landed money is 
spent, it compounds throughout sectors of the local-national 
economies (known as the economic multiplier effect) (Edwards et 
al., 2006; Copes & Charles, 2004; Hughes, 2003; FAO, 1999; Seijo, 
Defeo, & Salas, 1998; Lawson, 1984). 
Excluded from Testing 
Catch 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 13, 14
 
Catch refers to the total quantity of fish harvested and also refers 
to as fishing mortality (F)(FAO, 1999; Seijo, Defeo, & Salas, 1998). 
The proportion of fish landed (i.e. landed weight), is an attribute of 
catch; thus, I categorized landed weight under the catch indicator. 
Total Costs (TC) 



















profits at all 









Total costs are the sum of variable [costs dependent of the fishing 
activity (e.g. fuel, food, wages, etc.)] and fixed [costs independent 
of fishing activity (e.g. capital investments in vessel, licenses, 
quota, etc.)] costs (Bonzon, 2000; FAO, 1999; Seijo, Defeo, & Salas, 
1998; Lawson, 1984; Schaefer, 1957; Gordon, 1954).  
Profit/Rent (T-TC) 
1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14 
 
The literature categorizes profit (i.e. rent) as net revenue; it is a 
calculation of gross revenue, less total costs (Bonzon, 2000; FAO, 
1999; Seijo, Defeo, & Salas, 1998; Lawson, 1984; Shaefer, 1957; 
Gordon, 1954).  
Quota market value
 1, 6, 7, 10
 
This indicator refers to the average monetary worth of fishing 
quota within an open market system (Edwards et al., 2006; 
Pollnac, et al., 2006; FAO, 1999).  
Export value 
1, 5, 7, 8
 
In the Canadian context, Statistics Canada and provincial agencies 
(e.g. provincial fisheries departments, or independent boards) 
commonly quantify the domestic value received for fisheries 
products destined for global markets, by species or aggregated 
group, at the national and sub-national scale (Charles et al., 2002).  
License market value
 1, 7, 10, 12
 
This indicator refers to the average monetary worth of commercial 
fishing licenses within an open market system (Pollnac, et al., 
2006).  
GDP contribution
 3, 5, 7
 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is a valuation of all goods and 
services produced, within a given scale (CIA, 2003). GDP 
contribution is the proportion of value for all fishing activity, within 
the same scale, relative to GDP (Charles et al., 2002).  
Market price of fish (throughout value chain) 
1, 5, 10
 
Market prices represent the post-harvest values paid per unit 
weight, throughout all levels of the value chain (e.g. various 
wholesale and retail markets, at various spatial scales) (Angel et 
al., 2014; Lawson, 1984).  
Proportion of quota value to landed value
 1, 6
 
The literature presents this indicator graphically to display the 
value gap between annual quota prices and landed value. Edwards 
and colleagues (2006), and Copes and Charles (2004), discussed 
that a widening of this gap has led to inequity between fishing 




Ex-vessel price is landed value per unit of landed weight (e.g. $/kg 
or $/lb) - it is the price paid to the harvesters for their landings and 
represents the first stage of the value chain (Angel et al., 2014; 





A partnership is a licensing policy provision, which enables two 
license holders to combine their licenses on one vessel (Angel et 
al., 2014; DFO, 2011b).  
Number of business closures
 6
 




measuring the number of business closures can indicate the 
severity of downward economic trends. In the report, the analysts 
applied the indicator at the regional scale, but it is conceivable to 
conduct such an analysis at the community scale as well.  
Revenue per operational day
 6
 
A group of analysts in the US employ this indicator as a proxy 
measure of profitability (where the number of operational days, an 
attribute of effort, is a proxy for costs), across fleets in several US 
regional fisheries (MRAG Americas, 2014; Clay, Kitts, & Pinto da 
Silva, 2014; Kitts, et al., 2011). Over time, the analysts use this 
indicator, in conjunction with others, to assess the economic 
viability of fisheries.  
Income per operational day
6
 
In the context of a fisheries enterprise, the literature defines 
income as the share of the enterprise profits between the owner 
and crew. Therefore, income per operational day measures the 
economic output performance of the enterprise (MRAG Americas, 
2014; Clay, Kitts, & Pinto da Silva, 2014; Kitts, et al., 2011).  
 
 
Examining 4 financial indicators (Table 6; below), I selected income for further testing 
since the research collaborators repute that local knowledge holders in Grand Manan 
are able to report on income distribution trends across sectors and generations. 
Unfortunately, secondary data are unavailable for this indicator. I found that the other 
financial indicators are not easily interpreted and would require extensive surveying 





























Selected for Testing 
Income 
1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14
 
Income (i.e. wage) is the money that an individual earns from 
either labour (e.g. crew earnings) or capital gains (e.g. an 
enterprise owner’s wage derived from the profits of the firm). 
Analysts can present the indicator as either gross (before 
deductions) or net (minus deductions) income (MRAG Americas, 











Well-being    
Sustainability of 









Excluded from Testing 
Debt levels 
1, 5, 7, 8
 
In the context of fisheries, analysts represent debt levels as the 
average amount of money borrowed, by harvesters and firms to 
finance the costs of fishing, from financial bodies (e.g. banks, loan 
board, and other creditors). Excessive debt levels can negatively 
impact the economic resilience of the harvesters and firms 




Charles and colleagues (2002) collected data regarding the number 
of bankruptcies, in relation to debt levels, to indicate forces that 
have the potential of increasing the vulnerability of harvesters and 
lowering their resilience.  
Cost of living 
1, 3, 12, 13
 
Schirmer and Casey (2005) categorize this indicator as a measure 
of money spent to maintain a household (e.g. groceries, mortgage, 
rent, and other activities). In their social assessment handbook, 
the researchers described that analysts can compare the 
distribution of living expenses between fishing and other sectors of 
the economy, at the community scale. Schirmer and Casey (2005)  
also state that this indicator can indirectly aid in the assessment of 
the economic contributions of, and dependency on, the fishing 
sector.  
 
In table 7 (below), Angel et al. (2014) define the other 10 social and economic indicators 
as useful when examining fisheries dynamics beyond the traditional production model 
(Angel et al., 2014; GPCE, 2006; Rockwood, 2006; Schirmer & Casey, 2005; Claridge, 
2004; Charles et al., 2002; Dayarathe & Sivakumaran, 1994; Fredericks, Nair, & Yahaya, 
1985; Huq & Huq, 1985; Raymond, 1985). However, secondary data are not available 
for, and LK cannot easily interpret, these indicators. I also exclude the indicators because 















Indicators and Descriptions 
 
Health and 









































Excluded from Testing 
Human population
 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 10, 12, 13, 14
 
This indicator measures the number of individuals that inhabit a 
specific area or social unit (e.g. a community) (Rockwood, 2006).  
Migration 
1, 3, 4, 7, 10, 12, 13
 
This indicator assesses the movement of individuals, either into (i.e. 
immigration), or out of (i.e. emigration), a population, over time 
(Rockwood, 2006). It is typically measured quantitatively as a rate 
(proportion of individuals migrating, relative the initial population).  
Education level 
1, 3, 4, 7, 10, 12, 13
 
The literature describes that analysts can measure education level 
either generically (e.g. number of people with secondary or post-
secondary education) or in the context of fisheries (e.g. the number 
of harvesters with formal or informal training), both quantitatively 
and qualitatively, at the community scale (Angel et al., 2014; GPCE, 
2006; Schirmer & Casey, 2005; Raymond, 1985). 
Social capital
 1, 10, 12, 13
 
Evaluations of social networks are used to qualitatively report on 
social capital (i.e. cohesive, and cooperative social relationships 
which produce mutual benefits for members in a community or 
other social unit) (Schirmer & Casey, 2005; Claridge, 2004).  
Change in housing 
1, 3, 12
 
Generically, researchers can display housing trends with a variety of 
analytical techniques. For example, they can quantity fluctuations in 
the number of houses or duration of residency. Analysts can also 
use perceptions of trends to qualitatively examine the indicator 
(e.g. increasing, decreasing, or stable housing trends) (Schirmer and 
Casey, 2005). 
Number of accidents
 1, 5, 6
 
The literature regards the number of accidents as a measure of 
social well-being within a social unit (e.g. a community) (Angel et al., 
2014; Charles et al., 2002).  
 
Natural capital
 5, 8, 10
 
In the fisheries context, natural capital is the economic valuation of 
fisheries resources in marine ecosystems. Charles and collaborators 
(2002) quantified fisheries natural capital as a product of species 
biomass and inflation-adjusted fish prices.  
Distribution of housing by income 
1,2 
The quantification of housing distribution by income varies within 
the literature. Intrinsically, it is a measure of average income per 
household, and typically segregated by homeowner attributes (e.g. 
captain, crew, harvester, non-harvester, etc.) (Dayarathe & 
Sivakumaran, 1994; Fredericks, Nair, & Yahaya, 1985; Huq & Huq, 
1985).  
Value of ecosystem services 
1, 5 




services (e.g. ocean transport, nutrient cycling, species habitat, etc.) 
that ocean and coastal areas provide for humans and aquatic 
species. The indicator is an annual monetary valuation of these 
services, by area (km
2
) (Charles et al., 2002).  
Depreciation and appreciation of natural capital
 5 
In one article, the authors described this indicator as the increase 
(appreciation) or decrease (depreciation), of the value of fisheries 
natural capital, over time (Charles et al., 2002). 
 
Final Suite of Indicators 
The indicator selection process produced a narrow suite of 5 indicators of distribution of 
fishing benefits (number of licenses, number of vessels, employment, landed value, and 
income), from the 42 candidate indicators available, which are categorized as suitable 
for testing within the case fisheries of Grand Manan. I determined that this suite of 
indicators is suitable to evaluate the outcomes of the selected EAF equity and fairness 
policy objectives (p. 7) since I screened the set on the basis of the following attributes: 
distribution, benefits, community, time, and data availability.  Although I found that only 
5 indicators are suitable, it was the process by which the indicators were developed that 
is salient. The selection process I used was systematic (i.e. not arbitrary), which enabled 













In considering the distribution of fishery benefits, (1) there are policy statements and 
international agreements stating that distribution of benefit is an important 
consideration, with elements of equity and fairness to be included, (2) it is neglected in 
measurement/documentation and consideration, and thus needs to be articulated and 
made measureable, to be considered appropriately in management (Auditor General of 
Canada, 2011; DFO, 2010; FAO, 2009). Decision makers therefore require outcome-
based indicators to assess the extent to which these objectives have been achieved. 
Although no ideal measure for equity exists, the suite of indicators outlined in this 
chapter allows assessment of community-level distribution of benefits in terms of 
unevenness, and distributional change over time. Following the conceptual model by 
Coulter (1989), I measure how benefits from each case fishery are distributed within 
Grand Manan. Comparing distributional change over time can determine whether 
disparity is stable, increasing or decreasing (Schuhbauer, Sumaila, & Chuenpagdee, 
2015; Coulter, 1989).  
 
Community level indicators are a key feature of the design of the indicator suite 
described in this chapter. Although the EAF equity and fairness policy objectives 
emphasize the need to ensure that fishery benefits are distributed to coastal 
communities (DFO, 2010), the literature highlights that analysis of community-level 
impacts is often missing from conventional fisheries management (Berkes, et al., 2014; 




addresses the critical gap of community analysis by exploring various sources of primary 
and secondary data. My results signify that community-level analysis is attainable 
through integrated sources, even though constraints of the analysis limited the results to 
a set of just 5 indicators.  Also, there is the potential for future community-level analysis 
which may draw from the institutional and local knowledge data collection 
methodologies used in this thesis.       
 
Following the FAO (2009) guidance, this research invited the collaborators to participate 
during the early stages of the project’s design. Thus, the indicator selection process also 
satisfies recommendations from the literature by developing the suite of indicators to 
explicitly meet the needs of relevant users (i.e. the industry collaborators) from Grand 
Manan (Clay, Kitts, & Pinto da Silva, 2014; Edwards, 2008; Boyd & Charles, 2006; Rice & 
Rochet, 2005). This research triangulated the indicator selection approaches using the 
Grand Manan case fisheries.  Furthermore, the results echo the sentiments of the 
collaborative research literature –  the industry collaborators reported confidence in 
their positive experience with this research. The collaborative selection process also 
provided an additional level of scutiny (Yochum, Starr, & Wendt, 2011; Wiber, Charles, 
Kearney, & Berkes, 2009).  . The collaboration enhanced the scientific rigor of the 
research and enabled more indicators to be selected. Without the collaboration and 
access to LK, I would only be able to report on two indiactors (the number of licenses 





The selection process served an additional function through screening the CFRN 
framework indicators against the global literature. Though the missing indicators are not 
prevalent in the literature, the screening process provides a level of scrutiny for the 
CFRN framework.     
Limitations 
Due to insufficient fisheries data at the community scale, 37 of the 42 candidate 
indicators were excluded from further testing during the selection process. Currently, 
Canadian government institutions (e.g. DFO, Statistics Canada, Transport Canada, etc.) 
and municipalities do not regularly collect data beyond a limited scope of license and 
landings (i.e. volume and value) statistics by community fishing sector. Employment and 
unemployment rates are available; however, the institutions do not aggregate the data 
by fishing sector. The shortcomings stem from the systemic limitations of – and 
disconnect between – policy, data collection methodologies, and indicator development. 
These results mirror those found in Boyd & Charles (2006), and Barnett (2018).    
While the EAF equity and fairness policy objectives aim to ensure that fisheries 
resources, access, and other benefits are distributed equitably, the documents offer no 
definition of equity nor guidance on how to evaluate the success of the policy objectives 
(i.e. whether equity is achieved). Current institutional collection systems inevitably fail to 
meet the broad data requirements necessary to evaluate these policy outcomes, since 
the EAF equity and fairness policy objectives lack guidance for evaluation. By developing 




strides to overcome the evaluative limitations inherent in the EAF equity and fairness 
policies. However, there exists a dilemma; although new research aims to expand the 
breadth of indicators and policy analysis, persistent data deficiencies plague these 
efforts. This research closed gaps found in the secondary data by following 
recommendations from the literature and exploring additional data from local 
knowledge holders (Barnett, 2018; Clay, Kitts, & Pinto da Silva, 2014; FAO, 2009; 
Edwards, 2008; Boyd & Charles, 2006; Rice & Rochet, 2005). However, local knowledge 
sources also had limitations to the data that could be collected. Thus, it was the 
integration of multiple data sources that is critical to conduct the distribution of 




Improving fishery management, and specifically moving towards an Ecosystem Approach 
to Fisheries (EAF), requires integrating social and economic analyses which are often 
absent in the conventional management paradigm. The conventional paradigm focuses 
on a narrow single-species production model to manage fisheries. Canadian and 
international policy objectives echo the requirement of an EAF and call for analyses 
which explore the distribution of benefits and community-level impacts. The 
conventional paradigm overlooks the scale of community at which its policy decisions 




Canada echo the need for community-level assessment and warn of failed policies and 
negative community effects in Grand Manan. 
With a measure of success, this research applied an adapted selection methodology in 
an approach to develop indicators based on the needs of policy and affected 
stakeholders. The systematic approach produced a suite of 5 indicators (number of 
licenses, number of vessels, employment, landed value, and income) which are 
appropriate to be tested on three case fisheries in Grand Manan, in the contexts of 
community, fisheries, benefits, distribution, and data availability (the subject of chapter 
3).  
 
Future policy development and research efforts designing outcome-based indicators, 
which are reflective of policy, may learn from this systematic selection approach. Future 
efforts should incorporate stakeholder participation at the outset and throughout all 
research phases (design, data collection, analysis, and reporting) to strengthen scientific 
validity and the collective research experience. If the policy objective is to achieve equity 
in community fisheries and across generations, the literature review of this report may 
offer guidance to policy makers in the subjects of distribution, inequality, and equity 
measures. To overcome data constraints, I recommend expanding data collection efforts 
beyond current capacities – echoing calls from the literature. The inclusion of qualitative 
approaches is key to compliment quantitative analyses. Extensive community surveying 




extent of potential analyses. In the context of the CFRN, the framework developers may 
utilize this analysis and its selection process to broaden their list of indicators. 
 
Overall, this chapter presented a practical application of a selection process for social 
and economic indicators at the scale of a fishing community. This adapted systemic 
approach can contribute to Canadian and international advancement towards EAF. This 
research may help by informing how to incorporate community scale indicators (which 




















Chapter 3: Changing distribution of fishery benefits for the community of 
Grand Manan, NB and the Bay of Fundy. 
 
Introduction 
This chapter applies the suite of outcome-based indicators developed in chapter 2 
(number of licenses, number of vessels, employment, landed value, and income), to 
three fisheries (the lobster, herring purse seine, and <65ft mobile groundfish fisheries) in 
Grand Manan and in the broader Maritimes Region. In response to the need for 
consideration of distribution of benefits and (or including or especially) attention to 
equity and fairness considerations which may be considered part of an EAF, the suite of 
indicators evaluates the changing distribution of benefits in the community’s and the 
region’s case fisheries. The context and methods from Coulter (1989) are used to 
examine the current level of distributional inequality against past levels, and to assess 
whether/how distribution of benefit is changing over time. Growth in inequality is seen 
as negative within policy analysis, published literature, and industry stakeholders. 
“Inequality has created increasing divisions in society, which has led to poverty, class 
conflict, and other negative social consequences” (Coulter, 1989). 
  
There are various approaches to assess the impact of changes in distribution of benefits, 
e.g. when the distribution of fishing benefits is stable, predictable, or net positive 
through time (Schuhbauer, Sumaila, & Chuenpagdee, 2015; Auditor General of Canada, 





Understanding that there are linkages across multiple scales in social-ecological systems 
(SESs), the report also offers some assessment and insight into cross-scale connections. 
The study employs quantitative and qualitative methods and draws on local knowledge 
(LK) as well as secondary data sources. In this way, the chapter examines the following 
thesis questions: What data and knowledge are available in the case study relevant to 
indicators of the distribution of benefits? How has the distribution of benefits changed 
over time for Grand Manan fisheries and for regional fisheries? What are the broader 
impacts to the community and region? Is collaboration a useful tool in this research, as is 
emphasized in the literature?         
The lobster fishery 
Throughout its history, the lobster fishery (which is exploited by many communities 
throughout the region, including Grand Manan) has had a variety of conservation 
strategies implemented. Technical and biological measures began in 1873, when – 
warned by reports of lobster overfishing – the Department of Marine and Fisheries 
(predecessor of DFO) implemented measures prohibiting the landing of soft-shelled and 
berried (egg-bearing) females (DFO, 2011b). In the late 1800’s, the department 
introduced further conservation measures, which placed limits on legal carapace length 
(CL) sizes and the length of fishing seasons. In 1967, the department applied trap limits 
and fishing area restrictions to control the level of effort (i.e. input) within the fishery. 
From the mid 1980s and until the 2000s, additional series of technical and conservation 




notching, and further increases in CL) were implemented (DFO, 2011b; Marshall, 2009; 
Gough, 2007; Allaby, 1984).  
 
Parallel to the technical and biological measures above, the government also engaged in 
fleet management. In 1968, the department implemented a region-wide limited entry 
licensing policy with the objective to rationalize (reduce) the fleet for further lobster 
conservation. Within the licensing provisions, the department allowed: a) license holders 
to form partnerships with one another (whereby two license holders could fish both 
licenses under one vessel enterprise, and fish a maximum of 150% of a single license 
trap limit), and b) an independent core license holder may purchase a second license, 
which could be ‘stacked’ with the original license onto their vessel enterprise (the owner 
can fish 150% of a single license trap limit). The partnership and stacking provisions 
aimed to further reduce fishing effort; whereby, 50% of the traps from the second 
license would be removed from the fishery (DFO, 2011b).      
 
Additionally, in 1976, regional lobster fishing participation was further reduced via the 
“moonlighter” policy. The department created three license categories based on the 
license holder’s level of fisheries dependence: Category A (fully dependent); Category B 
(not fully dependent and attached historically to the fishery since 1968); and Category C 
(little or no dependency). Transferability limitations were also applied: Category B 
licenses expired after the retirement of the license holder and Category C licenses 




fleets (of those least dependent on the fishery) by implementing a license buy-back 
program, from 1978 to 1981. To date, DFO has not implemented output control 
measures (e.g. quota – which limits the harvestable quantity of fish) for this fishery 
(DFO, 2011b). 
 
A third form of lobster fishery regulation is spatial management. In 1968, the 
department delineated the spatial boundaries of lobster fishing areas (LFAs) throughout 
the Maritimes. The LFAs primarily fished by Grand Manan harvesters are LFA 38 and LFA 
38B (Figure 2). In LFA 38, the season is open from the second week of November to June 
30th, with a limit of 375 traps per single license. LFA 38B, also known as the ‘Grey Zone’, 
is a fishing area that exists within LFA 38 and is a disputed territory between Canada and 
the United States. In 2002, Grand Manan harvesters were permitted to fish in this 
territory, with licenses issued by DFO. Harvesters fish LFA 38B during a summer-fall 
season (June 30th - November 6th), also with a limit of 375 traps per license. LFA 37 is a 
shared territory and fished by LFA 36 and 38 license holders. Area 40 is George’s Bank 
and closed year-round to lobster fishing (DFO, 2013b; DFO, 2011b; Marshall, 2009; DFO, 
2007).     





Figure 2. Regional map of Lobster Fishing Areas (LFAs) 33-40 with inset Grand Manan map (Marshall, 
2009; DFO, 2007).  
 
The herring purse seine fishery 
 
The herring seine fishery of the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO) areas 
4VWX (Figure 3), is exploited by various communities including Grand Manan. 
Throughout its early history, from 1953 to 1969, the purse seine fishing was open 
access; where no limits existed on the number of vessels that could fish (a measure of 
effort/input) nor on harvestable quantities (i.e. output). Additionally, Canadian federal 
and provincial subsidization enabled capacity expansion of the regional herring fleets 
and processing plants to satisfy the global demand for fishmeal and oil products. These 
dynamics became problematic as the boom in catch rates in the late 1960’s began to 
subside. In 1970, as a conservation measure to rationalize the fleet, the department of 




entrants. During this time, the department did not restrict catch rates and over-fishing 
continued (DFO, 2013c; DFO, 1999; Stephenson et al., 1993).  
 
 
Figure 3. The spatial boundary of the herring purse seine fishery in NAFO 4VWX (DFO Maritimes Region) 
(DFO 2014a).  
 
In 1972, the regional fisheries management organization, the International Commission 
for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF; later NAFO), established national total 
allowable catches (TACs), through agreements between Canada and other member 
states. In accordance with bioeconomic theory, the ICNAF set the TAC by a process of 
stock assessment, review, and upper level management decisions.  Also, during this 
year, a cross-section of industry members and DFO personnel established the first 
fisheries advisory committee in Canada; known as the Atlantic Herring Management 
Committee (AHMC) (Iles, 1993; Stephenson et al., 1993).  
 
In 1975, low market prices for herring fishmeal triggered the restructuring ‘Bay of 




al., 1993). The project’s mandate was to “…discuss the fishermen's request for subsidies 
for the poor 1975 season, and to examine the problems of maintaining longer term 
viability of the industry”. Approved by the AHMC and then fisheries minister Romeo 
LeBlanc, in 1976, the project resulted in sweeping reforms. The reforms included:  
 
- The creation of a system to sub-allocate total fleet quota to individual license 
holders in the region’s purse seine sector (known as individual quota; IQs),  
- The formation of the Atlantic Herring Fishermen’s Marketing Co-operative 
(AHFMC; whose role was to negotiate herring prices between harvesters and 
processors, as well as manage the new IQ system), among other reforms 
(Gough, 2007; Iles, 1993;). 
 
Triggered by the extension of the US coastal jurisdiction, in 1977, Canada followed suit 
and extended its jurisdiction the same distance to 200nm (known as the Exclusive 
Economic Zone; EEZ). This period subsequently prompted rapid expansion of large 
fleets (through private and public investment) which had the matching capacity to 
exploit Canada’s offshore resources. Large harvesting and processing companies, 
heavily subsidized by provincial governments, emerged to develop these larger offshore 
fleets. This expansion period enabled these large companies to access large amounts of 
capital for future investments. This period also sparked a windfall of negative 
consequences (Gough, 2007; Iles, 1993).                    
 
In an effort to further rationalize the fleet, DFO changed the IQ system for this fishery 
to an individual transferrable quota (ITQ) system, in 1983. The ITQ system allowed for 
the temporary (lease) and permanent (sale) trade of quota between license holders. In 




became exempt from the owner-operator and fleet separation policies (below) (DFO, 
2010; Burke & Leslie, 2009). In addition, DFO manages the herring purse seine sector by 
a series of technical measures (e.g. mesh sizes, gear length, etc.) (Gough, 2007). From 
2007 until the present, the stated objectives of the rationalization programs were 
achieved, and the fleet size reduced regionally.  As of 2012, with the sinking of the 
Moon Raker, there are no herring purse seine vessels in Grand Manan. Although the 
purse seine fishery no longer exists in Grand Manan, it was economically and culturally 
significant during the island’s history. Therefore, it is important (as a research and 
community objective) to document the way benefits have been distributed away from 
the community, over time (Sonnenberg, M., personal communication, Sept. 26, 2013). 
The <65ft mobile groundfish fishery 
The <65ft mobile groundfish fleet (traditionally-based in many regional communities, 
including Grand Manan) shared a similar management history to that of the herring 
purse seine fleet. The fishery was open access, from 1948-1972. In 1973, the ICNAF 
placed an overall TAC on groundfish stocks within and outside of Canada’s national 
jurisdiction (12nm at the time). However, this did nothing to reduce over-capacity in the 
groundfish fleet, which resulted in overfishing. Consequently, Minister Romeo Leblanc 
announced a limited entry licensing policy for this Atlantic region fishery, in 1976. Under 
the Leblanc ‘Fishing Plan’, which coincided with the expansion of Canada’s 200nm EEZ, 
DFO subdivided the groundfish TAC by fleet sector (between mobile and fixed gears) 





Plagued by over-capacity and over-fishing, the groundfish fleets suffered low economic 
returns. To increase the rate of returns for enterprises, IQs were implemented for the 
<65ft mobile groundfish fleet in the Maritimes Region, in 1981. During the 1990-1991 
season, the fleet switched from IQs to ITQs (Gough, 2007).  
 
Like the purse seine fisheries, the NAFO 4X+5Y <65ft mobile groundfish fleet in the 
Maritimes Region (Figure 4) was exempted from the owner-operator and fleet 
separation policies (below), in 2007 (DFO, 2010; Burke & Leslie, 2009). In addition, 
throughout its history, DFO managed this fleet via a series of mandated technical 
measures (gear restrictions, minimum fish lengths, etc.). To date, there are still several 
<65ft mobile groundfish vessels and licenses in Grand Manan; however, all license 
holders lease their quota (primarily to vessels in Southwestern Nova Scotia) and do not 
direct for groundfish species using this gear type (Sonnenberg, M., personal 






Figure 4. Highlighted in red, the 4X+5Y fishing area is located within the Maritimes Region (DFO, 2014a). 
 
Broad Policy Issues 
Owner-operator and fleet separation policies 
 
In 1978, Fisheries Minister Romeo LeBlanc first introduced owner-operator and fleet 
separation policies to restrict corporate ownership, and to ensure that the benefits of 
Canadian inshore fisheries flow to the sector’s license holders and their coastal 
communities – a community-centric management model (DFO, 2010). He presented the 
policies, in a statement following the 1977 expansion of Canada’s coastal jurisdiction to 
200nm. The owner-operator provision requires license owners to fish the license 
personally. The fleet separation policy precludes the corporate ownership of ‘new’ 
licenses for <65ft vessels (DFO, 2003; DFO, 1996). DFO formalized the policies in the 
1985 Commercial Fisheries Licensing Policy for Eastern Canada (owner-operator policy – 




(DFO, 1985). However, DFO did not fully implement the owner-operator policy, 
throughout Maritimes Region, until 1989 (Gough, 2007).  
 
In 1996, DFO ratified the above policy, with two new clauses for the owner-operator and 
fleet separation policies. Under the owner-operator policy, “license holders who have 
previously (prior to 1996) designated an operator for one or more of their vessels could 
continue to do so under a grandfather clause” (DFO, 1996). Under the fleet separation 
policy, corporations which have held licenses for vessel less than 65 feet prior to 1979 
could continue to hold these licenses and buy/sell these licenses with other ‘pre-1979’ 
corporations (DFO, 1996).  
 
Some corporations (or individuals), that did not meet the exclusion criteria for the 
owner-operator and fleet separation policies, found an alternative way to buy licenses 
within the inshore fleets (lobster and others). Such firms (or individuals) have been able 
to buy the controlling ‘beneficial interest’ of a license by arranging a civil contract 
(known as a controlling or ‘trust’ agreement) between the firm (or individual) and a 
license holder. Within these controlling agreements, the firm (or individual) provides the 
financial capital to buy the license, and the ‘legal title’ of the license is ‘entrusted’ in the 
license holder’s name. Consequently, the license holder is indebted to the financier for 
the license cost. The ‘beneficial interest’ of the license (i.e. most of the revenues gained 
from fishing) flow toward the financier through debt servicing by the license holder 





These controlling agreements contravene the fleet separation and owner-operator 
policies (DFO, 2010). Between 1999 and 2004, DFO held an extensive industry 
consultation known as the Atlantic Fisheries Policy Review (AFPR). Included within the 
exploration of a comprehensive policy framework of the AFPR was an investigation of 
the extent of controlling agreements within Atlantic Canadian inshore fleets, and the 
problems surroundings these arrangements (DFO, 2003). On April 12, 2007, following 
the AFPR, DFO announced a policy to Preserve the Independence of the Inshore Fleet in 
Canada’s Atlantic Fisheries (PIIFCAF). The PIIFCAF measures stipulated that any core 
(full-time) license holder were to declare that their license is not financed through a 
controlling agreement; consequently, these licenses became classified as independent 
core (IC) licenses. Under the PIIFCAF measures, if any core license holder did not declare 
their independence within a 7-year period, or if officials found evidence of third-party 
control via ‘trust’ agreements, these license holders would not be able to re-issue their 
license after the grace period (April 12, 2014). In other words, companies and license 
holders had 7 years to dissolve these contracts. On July 24, 2015, federal Fisheries 
Minister Dominic Leblanc continued DFO’s commitment to honour PIIFCAF by 
strengthening the enforcement of fleet separation and owner-operator policies (DFO, 
2015a, Allain, M., personal communication, Jan. 23, 2013; DFO, 2010; DFO, 2003; Gough, 








In 1990, the Supreme Court of Canada R. v. Sparrow ruling held that aboriginal rights 
have a priority to fish for food, social, and ceremonial (FSC) purposes (DFO, 2015b). In 
1994, DFO created the Aboriginal Fisheries Strategy (AFS) in response to the Sparrow 
decision to manage the FSC fishery and provide funding to eligible aboriginal community 
groups via bi-party agreements. DFO also created the Allocation Transfer Program (ATP) 
under the AFS. The ATP “…facilitates the voluntary retirement of commercial fishing 
licenses and the issuance of communal licenses to eligible Aboriginal groups and 
includes funding for the purchase of equipment, such as vessels and gear necessary for 
Aboriginal groups to fish these licenses.” (DFO, 2018). Under the ATP, DFO bought back 
several commercial LFA 38 licenses in Grand Manan and reissued the licenses to Tobique 
First Nation, a Maliseet community in New Brunswick (Sonnenberg, M., personal 




I use Coulter’s (1989) distribution theory terminology of units and components to 
categorize the application of the suite of indicators to the case fisheries of Grand Manan 
and the broader region. Additionally, the indicators are bound by various attributes (i.e. 
metric options). For example, the attributes include segments of time (e.g. 1960s to 




component. The collaborators in the research recommended the retrospective period 
begin in the 1960s since it represents the community’s fisheries prior to major policy 
interventions, and a living oral history still exists for this period. I also include analysis of 
the driving factors of distribution and cross-scale linkages, using social-ecological 
systems (SESs) and community resilience theory. 
 
There are dozens of approaches to measure distribution of fisheries benefits. I selected 
the following five methods based on their prevalence in the literature, their capability to 
satisfy both the conceptual and technical criteria in Coulter (1989), their capacity to 
assess both relative and absolute inequality, and their interpretability of changing 
inequality within case study systems:              
 
1. Perceptions of trends (i.e. local knowledge of distribution patterns) 
 
- Local knowledge (LK) holders described how the distribution of 
benefits changed in relation to the community of Grand Manan, and 
among the case fisheries regionally. I collected the data using 
qualitative research techniques (cross-sectional, semi-structured 
interviewing) and the participants described distribution patterns 
changed over the period. This is a relative inequality measure since all 
fisheries sector components are not accounted for (Coulter, 1989).  
 
2. Proportional analysis of stacked linear trends 
 
- This quantitative approach stacks the total unit metrics for the benefit 
measured (historical fishery license and landed value data), by the 
community case fisheries, over time. These trends depict the relative 
change in distributional inequality.     
 
3. The Gini Coefficient 
 
- The Gini Coefficient is an absolute quantitative measure of inequality 




(e.g. number of licenses) and the total number of components (e.g. 
the number of LFAs – presented below), which includes null 
components (those receiving no share). The Gini Coefficient ranges 
between 0 (perfect equality) and 1 (maximum inequality, where one 
component receives 100% of the shares). 
 
4. The Lorenz Curve 
 
- The Lorenz Curve is a graphical representation of the Gini Coefficient. 
Creating a Lorenz Curve involves plotting the cumulative proportion of 
‘components’ (e.g. fisheries sectors or areas) on the x-axis, against the 
cumulative proportion of ‘units’ (e.g. money or the number of 
licenses) on the y-axis.  
 
5. Spatial distribution analysis 
 
- To display distributional changes in the case fisheries geographically, 
this visualization tool involves plotting the quantitative data from the 
proportional analysis on a map.     
 
Primary data: Local knowledge 
 
This analysis draws on data collected using a mix of qualitative and quantitative 
methods. Qualitative research involves a range of techniques employed by the 
observer(s) to collect data and information by observing and/or interviewing a sample 
population to collect the interpretations, meanings, and explanations of the subject at 
hand, as perceived by the participants (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011). Qualitative data can 
provide a foundation to compare supplemental quantitative data (i.e. concurrent design; 
ground-truthing). Using a combination of both data types can provide a better 
understanding of the research topic than either method could alone. Cross-referencing 
(i.e. triangulating) the datasets can also provide analysts with a powerful verification 




explain trends found in concurrent quantitative datasets (Barnett, 2014; Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2011; Gerring, 2007). 
 
From September, 2013 to December, 2014, I designed the primary data field survey via a 
series on iterative collaborative focus group discussions with industry, academic, and 
government partners. I also adapted protocols from similar studies in the literature 
(Barnett, 2014; Paterson & Kainge, 2014; Foley, Mather, & Neis, 2013; Parlee, 2011; Elo 
& Kyngäs, 2008; Hancock, 1998). Prior to the recruitment and interview phases, I 
received Research Ethics Board (REB) approval from Saint Mary’s University (SMU) in 
Halifax, NS (February 5, 2014). I compiled this research explicitly in accordance with the 
REB standards. As a REB requirement, I afforded participants the opportunity to give 
free and informed consent by providing them with operational procedures (in writing 
and read aloud).  
 
Since a range of active and inactive harvesters constituted the case fisheries, and 
information regarding these participants is confidential, I collaborated with the Grand 
Manan Fishermen’s Association (GMFA) to assist with recruitment (from February 5, 
2014 to March 31, 2014). I also used snowball sampling to identify additional 
participants. As the process involved use of non-random sampling, sampling errors could 





I maintained confidentiality by coding all participant information and using pseudonyms 
when referencing participants in text. All participant data are stored on a password-
protected computer within a locked facility. All research collaborators who have had 
access to participant data are bound by signed confidentiality agreements.     
 
I conducted interviews from March 31, 2014 to April 14, 2014 in Grand Manan. Each 
interview was approximately 2 hours in duration. I identified 42 potential participants 
based on their knowledge of Grand Manan and the regional fisheries. A total number of 
21 individuals agreed to participate in the survey. This subpopulation consisted of equal 
representation from the three case fisheries. All 7 lobster participants identified as 
active local license owner-operators. 5 herring participants identified as local retired 
harvesters (i.e. resident group), and I also interviewed 2 knowledgeable non-residents. 
For the mobile groundfish fishery, I interviewed 6 resident active and inactive license 
holders, along with 1 non-resident. I included non-residents in the survey based on their 
merits that each formerly worked directly with their respective fisheries and were 
knowledgeable of trends in Grand Manan. I separated their response rates accordingly. 
The entire group represents 3 generations, with a range of experience from 10-50 years, 
with several participants also having extensive experience in the processing, distribution, 





In 2014, I administered the semi-structured, cross-sectional survey in face-to-face and 
over-the-phone interviews. The survey consisted of 22 opened-ended questions 
(Appendix B) regarding the following general themes: 
- Personal history with the fishery. 
- Knowledge of how the case fisheries trends changed for each indicator over time 
(1960s to 2014), within Grand Manan. 
- Knowledge of changing distribution patterns, across scales (e.g. groups of 
individuals, the local community, and the region). 
- Perspectives on the drivers of change (e.g. policies which manage the fisheries, 
and other influencing factors).     
 
I recorded and transcribed all interviews. I afforded the participants the opportunity to 
change or recant their responses by reviewing the transcriptions with them. I 
synthesized and categorized the transcripts by fishery, common theme responses, 
participant groupings, and quantified response rates. The quotations used reflect 
common perceptions of distribution patterns and insights into the drivers affecting 
distributional change.  
 
Secondary data: Community Scale 
 
It should be noted that secondary data at this scale was only available for the number of 
licenses and landed value indicators. The Licensing Division of DFO in the Maritimes 
Region provided three excel datasets for the three fisheries sectors and included fields 
for active number of licenses grouped by year, community, and LFA. DFO only collects 
data for the village of Grand Manan (excluding Whitehead Island) – the data are not 
aggregated by township. Regarding the lobster data, licenses in LFA 38 and LFA 38B (the 




each fishery case sector, in Grand Manan over time within a stacked linear trend graph 
for years 1998 to 2012 (based on the common available time series for the fisheries).  
 
I also received three datasets from the Commercial Data Division of DFO (Maritimes), 
regarding landed nominal (uncorrected) value and including fields displaying year, 
community, and (in the case of the mobile groundfish sector) harvested species. This 
report focuses on Atlantic cod (Gadus morhua) – the GMFA regarded Atlantic cod as the 
primary commercial groundfish species, for Grand Manan. I present the distributional 
change of landed value, for each community fishery, within a stacked linear trend chart 
for the years 1980 to 2012. I corrected nominal value into constant 2012 dollar using the 
following equation: I first divided the consumer price index (CPI) of 2012 by the CPI of 
the year to be adjusted and the multiplied the quotient by the nominal value of that 
year.   
Nominal year to be adjusted *(CPI 2012/CPI year to be adjusted) 
 
Secondary data: Regional Scale 
 
Within the following four analytical techniques, I used the complete lobster license 
dataset provided by the Licensing Division of DFO. The selected methods assess the 
distribution of active licenses across the regional LFAs for the years 1998 to 2014. The 





I calculated the Gini Coefficients and plotted Lorenz curves for three equal segments 
across the above period. I plotted the Lorenz curves as a cumulative proportion of the 
number of LFAs (x-axis) in relation to the cumulative number of active licenses shared 
across the regional LFAs (y-axis). The curves, in each case, are compared to a straight 
line that reflects perfect equality (which would be the case if each LFA shared an equal 
number of licenses), to assess the extent of inequality. The more the Lorenz curve 
deviates from the equi-distribution (straight) line, the greater the degree of inequality. 
Again, the Gini Coefficient is a quantitative expression of the Lorenz curve and ranges 
between 0 (perfect equality) and 1 (maximum inequality; where, in this case, the license 
holders of one LFA possess 100% of the licenses). I calculated Gini Coefficients using the 
following equation (where n represents the number of LFAs in the regional fishery, and y 





I calculated and presented the change in distribution across the fishery’s LFAs spatially 
for the same period. First, I calculated the percentage point change in the proportional 
share of active licenses, for each LFA. Then, using an incremental color spectrum (of 5% 
intervals for each color), I plotted the results (by corresponding counties which held the 
licenses) on a Maritimes region map. The blue spectrum represents positive change, the 





For the years 1979 to 2011, I also illustrated the distribution of landed value (again 
adjusted to 2012 CAD), throughout the regional lobster fishery. I used DFO commercial 
data to calculate and plot: stacked linear trends, Gini Coefficient, Lorenz curves, and 
spatial data. Since DFO withheld mobile groundfish and herring seine data during 
periods when less than 5 licenses were active in a given community, I was unable to plot 
Gini Coefficients, Lorenz Curves, and spatial distribution trends for these fisheries.   
 
Using a stacked linear analysis for the mobile Atlantic cod fishery, I calculated the 
distribution of licenses across 5 categories throughout the region for the years 1998 to 
2013. Three categories display the license trends for Grand Manan, Pubnico, NS 
(currently the community with the largest share of licenses), and Yarmouth, NS 
(currently the community with the second largest share of licenses). To protect 
individual and enterprise privacy, DFO does not release license and commercial data for 
any communities which contain less than 5 licenses holders. Thus, for any community 
matching this privacy parameter (for any years of the dataset), DFO aggregated the 
licenses into a fourth unspecified category. For ease of analysis, I aggregated all 
remaining NS licenses into a fifth category.  Secondary herring data are considerably 











Change in fisheries benefits to Grand Manan 
 
The participants highlighted the historical chronology documented in the literature for 
the case fisheries. Prior to the sweeping management changes of the late 1960s and 
onward, the three key fisheries (lobster, herring seine, and mobile groundfish) were 
open access in Grand Manan. During this time, the participants stated that fisheries in 
Grand Manan were more diverse than today. They indicated that the community, its 
people, and their culture enjoyed a period of resilient prosperity which was driven by 
diverse and robust fishing fleets of the three sectors, which were traditionally 
independently-owned. Owners and their operations benefited from the revenues 
generated, crews benefited from gainful income and employment opportunities, and 
the local economy benefited from a healthy economic multiplier effect derived from the 
diversified economic activity. 
 
The general perception from participants reiterated that resource scarcity from 
overfishing triggered conservation policy interventions, from the late 1960s - onward. 
The participants argued that the quasi-property rights system of ITQs, implemented by 
DFO in 1976 and 1990 for the herring seine and mobile groundfish sectors (respectively), 
reinforced downward economic pressure on the fisheries – a compounding multiplier 
effect where a reduction in one sector of the economy can negatively affect other 




reduced enterprise revenue – for those who did not purchase additional quota. The 
majority of Grand Manan enterprises within these two local sectors became financially 
non-viable as costs rose, over time. Participant data indicates that Grand Manan herring 
seine operations ended in 2012, after the sinking of the last purse seiner, which was not 
replaced due to financial non-viability. Joan Marshall (2009) wrote that the community’s 
mobile groundfish fleet ceased operations after 2005, also due to financial non-viability. 
According to the participants, these dynamics and the open transferability rules of the 
ITQ system enabled extensive trading of licenses, quota, and vessels, and contributed to 
increasing local disparity and regional concentration of the two fishing fleets. Over time, 
the community lost several benefits (i.e. revenue, income, and employment) derived 
from these sectors, which are now concentrated elsewhere. Power dynamics also 
shifted.  These changes are highlighted by many of the participants in this research, as 
the following quotes indicate.  
 
Participant #24 noted, 
 
"As the allocation (ITQs) shrank, based on reductions in the TAC, the expenses of the 
enterprise become too great and, thus, the business becomes financially non-viable. As a 
result, independent harvesters (were) forced to sell or lease their remaining quota, as it 
is not viable to fish themselves". 
 
Regarding the herring seine industry, participant #5 said,  
 
“The fleet got smaller over the years. At first purse seiners used to be individually owned 
and operated, but over time these individuals sold (vessels and licenses, with attached 
quota) to companies. This was strongly related to the advent of individual quotas (IQs), 
in 1976. Companies were better financed than individuals and, as the over-the-side-sales 
faded, the market became restricted and the companies (in particular processing 
companies) dictated the markets (who and where the harvesters could sell to). Basically, 




convinced the fishermen that they would manage the marketing of the product. Over 
time, individual fishermen lost control of the industry as large corps bought up shares of 
the industry”.  
    
Furthermore, participant #20 recounts,  
 
“When the seiners left, there were 38 (harvesting) jobs that were lost…They were 
$50,000-$70,000 (per annum) jobs for the crew…(This) had a devastating effect on other 
sectors; (transportation), processing, and other services”. 
 
According to participant #12, mobile groundfish fleets in Grand Manan suffered a similar 
fate, 
 
"In the 1960s, there used to be 8-10 draggers (in Grand Manan) that carried 4 crew on 
average and, over time, that became less and less as the draggers were sold off". 
 
 
Participant #12 argued, 
 
"So, I think that's why the ITQ came in - so you could get the quota from two or three 
boats to make it viable. But somewhere along the line it went from someone owning 
enough quota to make it viable, to someone owning all the quota".  
 
Recent participant data from 2014 and secondary data (below) illustrates that the 
number of fisheries serving Grand Manan has become much reduced over the period 
examined in this research. Currently, of the three key Grand Manan fisheries, only 
lobster sector vessels, and their associated licenses, are still active. Over time, the 
community, its people, and their culture collectively lost access and associated benefits 
(revenue, income, and employment) to two of its three main fisheries.  
 
Participant #34 stated, “The whole economy (of Grand Manan) is dependent on one 
thing – lobsters”. The research collaborators from the GMFA also echoed this insight: 




Participant #13 predicted a potential associated hazard with the loss of diversified 
landed value, the increase dependence on a single species, and the subsequent 
reduction in community resilience. He said, “If the lobster fishery goes the same as the 
others that would be the death of the island”. The participant is alluding to concerns 
over perceived benefit losses in the community’s lobster industry – which I present in 
the regional dynamics section below. Participant #5 said the loss of landed value 
triggered an economic downturn multiplier effect within the community, “The trickle 
down (economic multiplier) effect has become smaller and smaller over the years” (Field 
Interviews, 2014).    
 
Table 8 depicts the participants’ perception of changes to the suite of selected benefits, 
through the period from the 1960s to 2014. The participants reported that access to key 
fisheries in Grand Manan became concentrated, over time. All herring seine licenses 
were sold to companies outside of Grand Manan, and only a few inactive mobile 
groundfish licenses remain in the community. The community also lost lobster licenses, 
but this was to a relatively lesser extent, in comparison. 
 
According to Participant #19 from the lobster sector,  
 
“The licenses are pretty well distributed around the community, other than the 4 
licenses that are owned by (a SWNS company). I don’t blame the business for buying 
(Grand Manan) licenses; he’s just a business man. I blame the federal government for 
letting it happen. The (SWNS) company owns two (GM licenses), and then there’s two 
more (GM licenses) that they designate operators and designate vessels, and just so 
happens that the vessels are owned by (the SWNS company). And they (the SWNS 






Participant #7 from the herring seine industry argued,  
 
“I’d like to go back to see your (study’s) number of vessels and (license) ownership…in 
the middle 1960’s, in Grand Manan, there was 14 purse seiners. Now (2014) they’re 




Participant #19 from the mobile groundfish sector reported, 
 
“I still have a groundfish license, but I would have to buy (lease) quota (to fish)”   
 
 
Table 8. Participant response rates and trend perceptions for the case fisheries, from the 1960s 
to 2014.   
  
 
The secondary data representing change of access (Figure 5; Appendix C) corroborates 
the participant survey data and shows that the total number of licenses for the three 
Grand Manan fisheries declined from 155 in 1998 to 130 in 2012. Also, the loss of access 
was particularly extensive for two of the fisheries. The community’s herring seine fishery 




license share (from 8% to 6%). As a result, the lobster fishery became even more 
dominant, with its share of the community’s fishery access rising from 86% to 94% over 
the comparative period (DFO, 2014b). Although the lobster fishery lost many licenses, 
the remaining licenses represented a larger proportion when compared to the total 
number of fisheries licenses in the community. Thus, there was a loss of diversified 
community fisheries access and an increasing dependence on the lobster fishery.      
 
 
Figure 5. Change in the distribution of fisheries licenses (1998-2012) for the lobster, herring purse 
seine, and mobile groundfish fisheries in Grand Manan (DFO, 2014b).  
 
 
According to the primary data, the manner by which fishery benefits flowed to the local 
Grand Manan economy – in the form of revenues generated from the key fisheries – 




1960s to 2014, while the remaining 14 respondents argued that landed herring purse 
seine and mobile groundfish values sharply declined to zero, over the same period.  
 
Figure 6 (below) verifies the primary data and displays a widening gap of fisheries 
revenue contributions across the fisheries. In 1980, the herring seine fishery contributed 
65% of the total value of the fisheries, and the lobster fisheries contributed the remaining 
35%. DFO did not release groundfish data for any years where there were less than 5 
licenses active in the community. The available data (Appendix D) shows that the mobile 
groundfish fishery generated a meagre share of total landed value from 1985 to 1992 and 
recorded its highest share of 7% in 1988. The community’s herring and mobile groundfish 
fleet operated at distances away from the coastal waters of Grand Manan, and thus 
regional landing dynamics have overshadowed the real revenues attributed to these local 
fleets.    
 
After 1997, the data shows that the lobster fishery is the only fishery in this comparison that 
generates landed gross revenues in Grand Manan, and that these revenues dramatically 
increased in the later period (Bank of Canada, 2014; DFO, 2014c). Regarding only these case 
studies, the figure shows that growth in landed lobster value is far greater than the losses in the 






 Figure 6. Change in the distribution of landed value (1980-2012) for the lobster, herring purse seine, and 
mobile groundfish fisheries in Grand Manan (Bank of Canada, 2014; DFO, 2014c) 
 
  
 All 21 surveyed participants reported that the number of vessels decreased from the 1960s to 
2014 (Table 8; above). Noted previously, the participants attributed reduction of Grand Manan 
vessels to the loss of fisheries access (i.e. licenses). Participant #17 reported the decline in 
vessel numbers perpetuated negative community effects: “There would have been some 
economic loss to the community (downturn multiplier effect) since there would have been less 
service on a lower number of vessels” (Field Interviews, 2014). 
 
 The employment survey results (Table 8; above) concur with the previous data: the community 
saw employment disparity increase across the fisheries. Participant #9 explained, “There isn’t 
the same amount of work as there used to be”. 14 participants noted Grand Manan completely 




the community’s lobster industry experienced relative or stable employment growth. 
Participant #13 stated that these losses equated to a deficit of something greater, “It takes the 
livelihoods out of the communities” (Field Interview, 2014).  
   
 Participant #34 offered insights into the main driver which perpetuated the harvesting sector’s 
labour disparity, resulting in downturn throughout the local economy (Table 9). He describes 
how, from 1963 to 2014, losses of physical capital (i.e. licences, quota, and vessels) directly 
resulted in employment loss in the harvesting sectors, and reinforced physical capital and 
employment losses in the community’s post-harvest sector. Two other participants confirmed 
the reduction and shift of the community’s processing sector. Participant #20 said, “(Our) family 
company (involved in harvesting, processing, buying, and transporting) transitioned from 
herring, to groundfish, (and) to lobster”. Participant #28 reported, “We were involved in the 
groundfish fishery until 2010…lobster have been our main thing for the (past) 3-5 years”. The 
wave of business closures rippled downward throughout the local economy and negatively 
impacted physical capital and employment in the manufacturing and service sectors. Participant 
#8 noted the same perspective, “Employment was lost in the peripheral jobs”. 
 
 Table 9, constructed with data from Participant #34, also suggests that the local lobster fishery 
remained resilient, despite negative vessel trends. The harvester’s data notes that while the 
number of vessels approximately decreased by half (approximately 130 to 65), the average 
number of crew per vessel approximately doubled from 1.5 to 3. Thus, the increase in labour 





 The data from participant #34 illustrates that for Grand Manan fisheries overall, approximately 
803 people lost their jobs between 1963 and 2014 - which is equivalent to 51.7% of the 
community’s current workforce (Statistics Canada, 2012). Although these numbers are 
approximations, the participant’s assessment aligns with the other results, and depicts the 
community-level downturn which stems from losses in fisheries access, revenue, and physical 
capital. The harvester also explained that the large employment loss had devastating effects on 
the current size of the Grand Manan labour force, “If you tried to start any of those businesses 
today, you couldn’t get the manpower… because there’s nobody here”. (Field Interviews, 
2014). 
Table 9. Comparison between the number of privately-owned businesses and employment, in Grand 






Lastly, the primary data depicts that the variety of sources which yield   benefits for Grand 
Manan fisheries contracted. These results support the findings from the secondary data. 
Participant #5 said, “The disparity grew over time”. According to the 14 herring seine and 
mobile groundfish survey participants from the 1960s to 2014, the industries experienced 
severe declines in total incomes. A mobile groundfish harvester (participant #33) reported a 
driver of income disparity and notes the extent of the disparity,  
 
“2-3 big companies have it all and instead of a thousand workers in small coastal communities, 
you have a hundred working at lower wages. They make millions while you have nothing”.  
 
In comparison to the other two fisheries, 7 lobster harvesters noted a relatively positive 
situation. Participant #19 said that his company paid an increase in wages to an increasing 
number of labourers, “In the Mid-1990s to 2014, we had an extra guy paid a day wage”. On the 
other hand, another lobster fisherman (participant #34) provided a different perspective, 
“…fishermen today would make relatively the same or less than fishermen years ago, who 
fished with less effort”. Although the latter harvester describes muted income growth within 




The Lobster Fishery  
 
Elaborating on their previous responses, the surveyed lobster harvesters reported that several 
Grand Manan lobster licenses were redistributed to communities in Southwestern Nova Scotia 
and mainland New Brunswick. According to 6 harvesters, a Southwestern Nova Scotia (SWNS) 




argued that these arrangements circumvented fleet separation and owner-operator policies. 
The harvesters also stated that several Grand Manan lobster licenses were transferred to an 
aboriginal community group in mainland New Brunswick via the federally funded Allocation 
Transfer Program (ATP).  
 
Participant #22 articulated his concern over the impact of the loss of lobster fishery access on 
the community. According to him, the revenue generated from one license, along with the 
partial revenue of a second license, accounts for approximately 1% of the Grand Manan 
economy. He said, “…when you’re talking about one license being gone, it’s not like it’s nothing. 
And when it’s 12 licenses that’s gone, or 13…”. 
 
Furthermore, participant #25 described his insights into the resulting knock-on effects of the 
loss of fisheries access in Grand Manan, 
 
“Those crews are coming from Nova Scotia. And that’s good for Nova Scotia, but it’s not good 
for New Brunswick. They buy rope in Nova Scotia, they buy their fuel in Nova Scotia, and the 
lobsters go back there. So, instead of getting 4 direct jobs from the lobster licenses, and about 
half a dozen indirect jobs, there’s nothing – except a (Grand Manan) guy getting his lease fee”.  
 
The regional secondary license data results differ from that of the harvesters (to be discussed 
later). Figure 7 shows a generally stable distribution trend with a few areas improving there 
share (Appendix E). After the inclusion of LFA 38B (the ‘Grey Zone’), Grand Manan harvesters 
received an incremental addition of 40 licenses, from 2002 to 2014. These licenses buffered the 
community against the losses of 28 licenses experienced in LFA 38, throughout the period. In 
comparison to the regional change of licenses, the community gained 1 percentage point and 




County) also added 16 licenses, throughout the period, yielding a gain of 1 percentage point; 
the community currently shares 1% of the total fisheries access. Interestingly, although LFA 34 
(red) lost 62 licenses, it gained 1 percentage point and possesses the dominant fisheries access 
share (47%).  
 
The map (Figure 8) shows that license loss in the remaining LFAs (categorized by their 
respective counties) was greater than that of district 34; this dynamic resulted in an increase in 
the proportion of licenses held in LFA 34 (DFO, 2014b; Government of Nova Scotia, 2012). 
Unfortunately, the data and DFO do not specify whether the licenses were removed from the 
fisheries system. The literature review and primary data suggest that licenses were either 
retired (i.e. removed) or reissued during the various rationalization programs. The 
quantifications are only based on the number of active licenses, and do not include inactive or 








Figure 7. Linear trend of distributional change in access for the regional lobster fishery (1998-






Figure 8. Change in the spatial distribution of regional lobster licenses (1998-2014) (DFO, 2014b; 





In figure 9, the Lorenz Curves show essentially no change in the regional distribution of 
lobster fishery access, from 1998 to 2014. Examining the Gini Coefficients, there is a 
slight increase in distributional unevenness (from 0.60 in 1998, to 0.58 in 2014) (DFO, 
2014b). These results are likely due to the addition of Tobique First Nation to the fishery 




Figure 9. Lorenz Curves and Gini Coefficients depicting the absolute distributional change of 
regional lobster fishery access (1998-2014) (DFO, 2014b).  
 
Regarding landed value, the interviewed lobster harvesters universally reported 
distributional change resulting from changes in ownership characteristics. Traditionally, 
lobster enterprises in Grand Manan were owned independently. Today, companies (e.g. 
one from Southwestern Nova Scotia) control some of the lobster enterprises in Grand 
Manan via trust agreements and other equity financing arrangements. Consequently, 




redistributed to companies and other communities. Second generation harvesters share 
less of the fishery’s value than previous generations. Participant #23 argued,  
 
“I was absolutely alarmed when all of sudden, out of the blue (a SWNS firm bought a 
license from an LFA 38 harvester). You can’t do that…it’s a Grand Manan and White 
Head (Island) license, you just can’t! Then all of a sudden it was allowed – it was never 
allowed…You never used to be able to sell a lobster license outside of Grand Manan 
until 2007…You see, if you go back and do you research, it was Romeo LeBlanc that was 
the federal minister of fisheries, and if you read the reason why he made up the lobster 
districts (LFAs) – it was so that the wealth from the ocean was equally distributed to the 
coastal communities on the Atlantic coastal of Canada.” 
 
Participant #34 explained the high costs of license and enterprise ownership creates 
barriers to second generation entry and is driving a greater number of these harvesters 
to seek equity financing. These dynamics shifted the distribution of landed value, along 
with the balance of power.  
 
“When the companies get into it (fishing industry) that’s the end of it…If you took the 
companies out of it, right on Grand Manan, right now, and said no more companies can 
finance boats and keep these guys (second generation harvesters) going and pay their 
bills, 75% of (those harvesters) would close and go home.” 
 
When asked to elaborate whether companies financed 75% of the harvesters through 
trust agreements, participant #34 explained,  
 
“No, they’re committed to the companies because they’re in debt to their eyeballs to 
them. (The harvesters) planned on it. They look at us and shake their heads: how come 
we (referring to himself and other first generation/independent harvesters) don’t do it 
(equity financing)? We buy what we can and do what we can. We don’t have no fancy 
boats or nothing, but I can go wherever I want to and sell to whoever I want to, and they 
can’t go anywhere. They’re committed...to the buyer, and that’s no way to operate.” 
(Field Interview, 2014) 
 
A common thread emerges in this case that shifting patterns of licenses, resulting from 




agreements, and equity financing), underpins the changing distribution trends in the 
other indicators. As the licenses left the island, or joined in partnerships, these dynamics 
prevented many captains, crews, and their vessels from accessing the fishery. Although 
it appears that employment and incomes may have increased for the Grand Manan 
fishery, there exists a paradox – the community has experienced an erosion of its 
independent fleet, which previously wholly benefited from this community sector. 
Furthermore, benefits increasingly shifted to Southwestern Nova Scotia and the New 
Brunswick aboriginal community.  
 
When asked if any management strategies affected employment and total income in 
Grand Manan, participant #17 replied, 
 
“Not really, other than the native licenses. Native licenses have been bought from Grand 
Manan and leased to SWNS - so the people of Grand Manan have lost the benefits 
(referring to employment and income) of those licenses”.   
 
In contrast, the secondary data shows (Appendix F) that disparity decreased for regional 
distribution of adjusted landed lobster value, over time. Figure 10 shows that the value 
gap between the dominant LFA 34 and other LFAs (including Grand Manan) narrowed 
from 2005 to 2011. Similarly, figure 11 illustrates that the counties and communities 
which fish LFA 34 experienced a 14-percentage point drop in gross lobster revenue, 
while the other respective counties (which includes Grand Manan) saw gains 
(Government of Nova Scotia, 2012). In absolute terms of measuring these distribution 
patterns, the Lorenz Curves characteristically moved closer toward the equi-distribution 




Gini Coefficient also signifies decreasing distributional variability, moving from 0.61 in 
1979, to 0.47 in 2011 (Bank of Canada, 2014; DFO, 2014). 
 
 
Figure 10. Trends displaying the distributional change of adjusted regional lobster value (1979-












Figure 11. Spatial distributional change of adjusted regional lobster landed value (1979-2011) 






Figure 12. Lorenz Curves and Gini Coefficients for the regional distribution of adjusted lobster 
landed value (1979-2011) (Bank of Canada, 2014; DFO, 2014c). 
  
 
The Herring Purse Seine Fishery 
 
From the 1960s to 2014, the herring respondents explained that resource scarcity, open 
market trading, and financial instability contributed to narrowing the distribution of 
fishery benefits in Grand Manan and broadened regional disparity. Over time, a few 
companies in Southwestern New Brunswick (SWNB) and Southwestern Nova Scotia 
(SWNS) bought all the herring purse seine licenses and associated quota from Grand 
Manan enterprise owners. The herring seine fleet consolidated, and the suite of benefits 
derived from this fishery (revenue, income, and employment) increasingly became 






Participant #7 reported,     
 
“In 1950, there was probably 14 seiners on Grand Manan and possibly the same amount 
on Campobello… (Regarding the sale of his vessel) the quota stayed with the boat and it 
went to Nova Scotia… Now there’s only 3 (seiners) that are fishing for (one New 
Brunswick company) …the reason that you’re down to only 3 (seiners) is really because 
of the quotas”. 
 
The same participant described how the post-harvesting sector also consolidated 
regionally:  
“Well at one time the NB company used to have about 7 or 8 sardine plants. Now what 
do they have? They just have the one in Blacks Harbour. They (NB company) used to 
have one (sardine plant) here on Grand Manan, they had one in Weymouth, NS, they 
had one in Campobello, NB, they had one on Deer Island, NB, one in Back Bay, NB and 
one in Blacks Harbour, NB – and that was the big one.” 
 
Participant #5 concurs, 
 
“… (The) few large plant companies that are left (are) in SWNB and SWNS”. 
 
Participant #20 estimated the decreasing herring seine labour force: 
  
“Now, approximately only 20% of (the past labour force) are employed in this fishery”   
 
    
The <65ft Mobile Groundfish Fishery 
 
 
Analogous to the dynamics affecting distribution in the herring seine fishery, the 
traditional and independent mobile groundfish fleet consolidated over time under the 
ownership of a few Southwestern Nova Scotia firms with large market capitalization. 
The vessel rationalization expanded disparity, which triggered a movement of revenue, 





According to Participant #12, 
 
“…once the quota came in they all sold out to SWNS and now that area owns the 
works”. 
 
Participant #13 provided comments regarding the implications and contributing factors 
of the regional fleet concentration:  
 
“It’s better to have 100 boats fishing and making a little bit of money than having 5-10 
boats fishing the lion’s share of the quota. It takes the livelihoods out of the 
communities…and concentrates it into one or two (communities)…all these jobs were 
lost to a few companies in SWNS…government policies have negatively affected the 
community by allowing outside companies to buy quota and licenses on Grand Manan”. 
 
Participant #9 reported that adjacency was a contributing dynamic in the shifting 
distributional variability of the regional mobile groundfish fishery: 
 
“The people that benefited the most (were) those that fished offshore – like those in 
Pubnico and SWNS – because they were closer (more adjacent) to a constant supply of 
fish. So, they bought out those that didn’t have that (adjacency). This fleet wouldn’t go 
down there because there would be an increased cost in fuel”.  
 
 
Participant #32 agrees, 
 
“Most people on Grand Manan fished the Northeast Bank, in the Bay of Fundy and 
down as far Brown’s Bank. But the people in NS fished on George’s Bank, Emerald Bank, 
Eastern Bank, Sambro Bank, Lehave Bank, etc. – which was right on their doorstep. From 
(Grand Manan) to George’s (Bank) is a 22-hour steam (however, the area is closer to 
SWNS) … I made most of my living around NS”   
 
Furthermore, Participant #35 reported, 
 
“…most of the fish were landed in NS and as they got a better price there…SWNS 
benefited as a lot of the catch was landed there”.  
 
Figure 13 (below) verifies the primary data and illustrates that distributional variability 
increased throughout the regional mobile groundfish fishery from 1998 to 2013 




communities of Pubnico and Yarmouth (in Southwestern Nova Scotia) respectively 
gained 8 and 3 percentage points of the total fishery's access. Other communities (for 
which the data are aggregated into an unspecified category) also gained 4 percentage 
points of the license share. The remaining Nova Scotian communities experienced the 
greatest proportional access loss (-14 percentage points or -82 licenses), during the 
period (DFO, 2014b).  
 
 
Figure 13. Change in the distribution of regional access trends for the mobile groundfish fishery 
(1998-2013) (DFO, 2014b).  
 
Although Grand Manan maintains access to the mobile groundfish fishery, the analysis 
of the primary data reveals that these licenses are inactive and only a small group of the 
community’s license holders benefit from revenue generated by leasing quota annually 
to SWNS firms.  Participant #9 said, “Some still have mobile groundfish quota (as they 




According to Participant #33, “…there’s 2-5 people that own quota and (lease) it out to 
NS every year”.  Participant #13 talked about the financial incentive of leasing quota, “I 




Changing Distribution of Community Fishing Benefits and Policy Analysis 
 
Overall, the diversity of access to key fisheries in Grand Manan (i.e. lobster, herring 
seine, and mobile groundfish) has declined over time, leaving only lobster as an active 
fishery. This represents that the distribution of fishing benefits have narrowed in Grand 
Manan and the EAF policy objectives pertaining to equity and fairness have not been 
achieved in this context. Now, second generation Grand Manan harvesters do not have 
the same traditional, diverse multi-species fisheries access as previous generations. 
Consequently, the policy objective of intergenerational equity – described as a key 
concept of sustainable fisheries management by FAO (2009) – has not been achieved. 
The primary and secondary data showed that the number of fisheries available to Grand 
Manan fishers declined over time. It should be noted that the suite of 5 indicators 
(number of licenses, landed value, number of vessels, employment, and income) are 
related and potentially correlated.  
 
This research presents evidence to inform policy-makers, and other interested parties, 




performance of the equity and fairness EAF policy objectives. Additionally, the primary 
data offers insights into the negative community effects of increasing disparity; namely, 
that the increasing disparity contributed to economic downturn and there is evidence 
that suggests the community is less resilient.  
 
Diversity (i.e. heterogeneity), coupled with other social-ecological factors, is a key 
component to the resilience of social-ecological systems. Furthermore, resilience is the 
ability of the system to rebound from shocks, and maintain its integrity (Berkes & Ross, 
2012; Marshall & Marshall, 2007; Charles et al., 2002). Diverse components of a system 
buffer against the shocks to help maintain the system’s functionality (Hansen et al., 
2015). In the past, Grand Manan’s multi-species fisheries offered a range of diverse 
physical capital, access, value, employment, income, and traditional livelihoods 
(Marshall, 2009). These diverse aspects indicate that Grand Manan was once a resilient 
community - evident with the persistence of the lobster fishery, over the period. As 
Grand Manan suffered the shocks stemming from the downturn in the herring seine and 
mobile groundfish fisheries, the lobster fishery bolstered the community, at least in 
terms of landed value. Unfortunately, as time progressed, the revenue gains in the 
lobster fishery were unable to buffer against the knock-on effects of broad community 
downturn, and the losses in the herring and groundfish fisheries affected the local 
economy. Consequently, the community is now less diverse, less resilient, and more 





All survey participants noted that transferability of licenses is one driver that has 
contributed to the increasing inequality throughout the fisheries. Over the past four 
decades, transferability has been the subject of a deeply divided discourse regarding its 
benefits and costs. Proponents argued that transferability: increases economic 
efficiency and profitability (by incentivizing less efficient operators to sell, or for more 
efficient operators to buy), is necessary for properly functioning markets, promotes a 
greater sense of ownership and environmental stewardship, and fleet 
consolidation/rationalization ensures conservation objectives are achieved (Barnett, 
2014; Gough, 2007). In contrast, opponents contend transferability leads to a host of 
negative consequences – chief among them: consolidation of licenses to large 
companies and industrial fleets with wealth moving out of fishing communities, and a 
disproportionate number of well-financed firms and individuals benefiting in 
comparison to other small-scale, independent, and second-generation harvesters. 
Studies also indicate that the community stability resulting from non-transferability 
promotes a greater sense of ownership and environmental stewardship and helps 
conservation objectives to be achieved (Barnett, 2014; Haas, 2014; Gough, 2007; 
Edwards et al., 2006; Copes & Charles, 2004; McCay, 2004; McCay, 1996; Levelton, 
1981). The results of this research align with the latter arguments and provide further 
evidence that the ease of fisheries license and/or quota transferability contributed to 






The primary lobster data offers evidence of changing distribution of benefits throughout 
the region. At the regional scale, the fishery fails to meet the PIIFCAF policy objective – 
fishing benefits (i.e. access, value, vessels, employment, and income) have flowed away 
from the harvesters and community of Grand Manan.  
 
The results also demonstrate that the other two key Grand Manan fisheries (herring and 
groundfish) had changes in the distribution of benefits that led to increased 
concentration of those benefits over time. Consequently, the suite of benefits (i.e. 
landed value, vessels, income, and employment) have been redistributed away from 
many coastal communities (including Grand Manan), resulting in increased 
intergenerational disparity. These community consequences and the EAF equity and 
fairness policy outcomes were left unmonitored for decades.   
 
Overall, multiple reports from participants argued that open transferability contributed 
to the increasing regional inequality. Again, there are some proponents which support 
open market systems which benefit efficient enterprises and enables consolidation. 
However, this research shows that increasing regional inequality has had a greater 
negative impact on communities like Grand Manan, in comparison to the relative gains 
of the fortunate few.  
 
There may also be broad policy implications regarding open transferability. This research 




against the negative community impacts of open transferability. The literature 
recommends policy alternatives which benefit those dependent on common-pool 
fisheries resources, through policies which are community-focused, involve full industry, 
government, and academic collaboration, and are supported by integrating multiple 
sources of knowledge (Barnett, 2014; CFRN, 2013; FAO, 2009; Ostrom, 2009; Edwards et 
al., 2006; Copes & Charles, 2004; McCay, 2004). Based on the results of this thesis, I 
recommend further exploring these policy alternatives.       
Data: Strengths and limitations    
 
Triangulating (i.e. cross-referencing) quantitative and qualitative data produced strong 
evidence of increasing disparity.  The data revealed that disparity continued to grow in 
the herring and groundfish fisheries at the community and regional scales. 
Consequently, these approaches satisfy the utility requirements prescribed by the 
literature – where multiple data sources provide robust monitoring and increase the 
scientific validity of the research (Barnett, 2014; Edwards, 2008; Gerring, 2007; Boyd & 
Charles, 2006; Rice & Rochet, 2005; Garcia, Staples, & Chesson, 2000).    
Moreover, triangulating primary data not only indicates increasing community and 
regional inequality for the herring and groundfish fisheries, but also provides 
perspectives into the microeconomic, ecological, and institutional drivers which have 
reinforced this inequality. Coulter (1989) highlighted that understanding the causes of 
inequality are critical to efforts which measure this phenomenon, and other efforts 




objectives of conservation, economic prosperity, equity, and the trade-offs of these 
decisions, can use this case study (and similar research) to form a suitable basis for 
assessing distributional impacts. 
Unfortunately, a narrow scope of data collection, and a privacy policy which restricted 
access to data, constrained the availability of secondary data. Consequently, I was 
unable to cross-reference the primary data gathered for the number of vessels, 
employment, and income indicators, with secondary data, which limited the level of 
validation. Nevertheless, the primary data for the latter indicators also signified 
increasing community and regional disparity for the herring and groundfish fisheries. 
Reflecting on the social-ecological systems (SESs) theory, these results are logical since 
there are cross-scale linkages in these systems. Thus, changes in one scale of a fisheries 
system ultimately impact another scale as they are interdependent (Berkes et al., 2014; 
Barnett, 2014; FAO, 2009; Ostrom, 2009; Lui et al., 2007; Wilson, 2006; Hughes et al. 
2005; Berkes, Folke & Colding, 1998).   
 
Another anomaly emerged – the regional secondary data on lobster licenses and 
revenue diverged from the primary data and indicated distributional variability 
decreased for these metrics. This divergence occurs due to the collection and 
aggregation of each type of data. I solely sourced the primary data from Grand Manan 
harvesters (local scale) who offered their knowledge of the micro-economy. In other 
words, their viewpoints represent their insights into the interactions between 




Additionally, the participants argued that the revenues generated from several LFA 38 
licenses are being disproportionately distributed to SWNS (i.e. communities adjacent to 
LFA 34). This seemingly subtle nuance can have stark consequences for the local 
economy – as described by the participants. This distinction further alludes to the 
deficiencies within public data sets; particularly, current secondary data collection 
methods are unable to accurately monitor absolute community distribution patterns.      
 
Under further examination, the regional lobster secondary data reveals that on a broad 
regional scale, and not considering the possibility of controlling agreements over lobster 
licenses, the distributional change of access was stable even though the total number of 
licenses declined, over time. The data depicts a dynamic where fewer licenses have 
become more broadly distributed to an increasing number of stakeholders (namely, 
increased access to LFA 38B, and increased aboriginal communal access to LFA 38). With 
respect to lobster revenues, the secondary data depicts that landed value become more 
widely distributed even considering a large decline in LFA 34. The increased access to 
LFA 38B and to the aboriginal community is also contributing to this dynamic – lobster 
value is now more evenly spread to a greater number of social components, than in 
previous years. 
 
The regional lobster secondary data also sheds light on the distribution of benefits to a 
First Nation community. The Tobique First Nation in New Brunswick increased their 




(Sonnenberg, M., personal communication, Sept. 26, 2013). However, the landed value 
data depicts no increase in the community’s revenue. This anomaly may be due to how 
the data are aggregated. Since DFO aggregates the data by the communities where 
lobster is landed, and since the Tobique community is land-locked, the data do not 
reflect the true value gained by the community nor its fishery participants. Also, the 
primary data reveals that many Tobique licenses are leased and as a result, presumably 
some of the benefits from the fishery are flowing to communities in Southwestern Nova 
Scotia. Further research is needed to examine the full extent of how this community, its 
harvesters, and others across the region are benefiting from the fisheries.     
 
Since it was not feasible to conduct a broad regional survey, the current primary dataset 
does not fully represent macroeconomic trends – it only provides participants insights 
into these trends. DFO aggregated the secondary data at the regional scale, which 
depicts trends across the macro-economy – distribution of access and value amongst 
the regional counties. However, since the secondary data do not incorporate 
microeconomic data within the aggregation (e.g. the distribution of access and value 
across the number of license holders or firms throughout the region), the analysis likely 
obscures the actual regional distribution trends. Therefore, to strengthen the 
knowledge base to depict these trends more accurately will require further investigation 





Chapter 4: Conclusions 
 
In the wake of the failure of conventional fisheries management, there has been a 
decades-long global movement which strives for a paradigm shift (FAO, 2009). Since 
fisheries are inherently complex social-ecological systems (SESs), they require a 
management regime which holistically and adaptively responds to the many wicked 
problems which challenge the integrity of these systems. Pundits propose that the 
ecosystem approach to fisheries (EAF) paradigm has the broad proactive capabilities 
that are required to affect positive change in global fisheries.   
 
Proponents acclaim that the EAF is particularly attuned to the demands of fisheries SESs, 
by addressing compounding societal and ecological challenges. The EAF is designed to 
account for the shortcomings of conventional fisheries management, by also considering 
distribution and impacts to coastal communities (to name a few fisheries aspects). As 
the EAF has evolved globally, policies and respective frameworks have emerged to 
reflect the EAF constitutions. In the Canadian context, the Canadian Fisheries Research 
Network (CFRN) has developed the Comprehensive Fisheries Sustainability Framework 
in collaboration with academics, industry stakeholders, and government officials in 
response to the global EAF movement. The CFRN framework provides a holistic set of 
outcome-based indicators and corresponding attribute metrics which examine the  
following four pillars of sustainability, relative to underlying policy objectives: ecological, 




The goal of this research was to assess the outcomes of EAF equity and fairness policies 
which pertain to objectives of the distribution of access, community benefits, and 
intergenerational equity. I develop and test a suite of indicators, which are capable of 
evaluating the EAF equity and fairness policy objectives (in chapter 1).     
These objectives prescribe that net benefits from fisheries shall be equitably distributed 
across generations of harvesters and their communities. Furthermore, not only does this 
thesis respond to the research requirements for testing the CFRN framework and the 
shortcomings of global policy frameworks, but it is also an academic response to an 
industry-driven research objective. Explicitly, this research acknowledges the reports 
from the independent harvesting sector regarding increasing distributional variability in 
the community fisheries of Grand Manan, NB. Moreover, I explore the changing 
distribution of net benefits within three of the community’s fisheries (lobster, herring 
seine, and mobile groundfish) and the challenges they are purported to be facing.       
 
Throughout the thesis, I contemplated the following thesis questions: to what extent 
has the distribution of net benefits changed within these Grand Manan fisheries? What 
knowledge sources can be gathered on this subject? Is collaboration useful? In chapter 
2, using a systematic selection methodology, I aggregated social and economic 
candidate indicators from the literature and screened them against a series of utility 
criteria. I used the criteria to analyze the indicators’ utility of evaluating the case 
fisheries in the various contexts of the policy and industry objectives: community, the 





This analysis produced a suite of 5 applicable indicators (number of licenses, number of 
vessels, employment, landed value, and income) out of a total of 42 global social and 
economic indicators. A narrow institutional data collection regime and the thesis scope 
constrained the utility of global indicators at the community scale. Albeit, the goal 
should not be to amass and analyze the largest set of indicators. On the contrary, the 
literature argues that this practice should be avoided and that an appropriate minimum 
dataset can offer decision makers and industry groups with an understandable 
appreciation of the fishery (FAO, 2009; Rice & Rochet, 2005).                
 
In chapter three, I applied the suite of benefits indicators to the three case fisheries in 
Grand Manan using quantitative and qualitative techniques. Secondary data, which was 
only available to account for the number of licenses and landed value, revealed that the 
local economy became less diversified. Out of the three fisheries assessed, only the 
lobster fishery remains. The primary data corroborated the latter findings and exposed a 
deeper narrative. Fisheries access loss and the outward sale of physical assets (e.g. 
vessels) contributed to increasing unemployment and income disparity. This local 
economic downturn and the homogeneity of the social and economic fabric have 
destabilized the community’s resilience and increased its vulnerability. Furthermore, 
license transferability policies enabled these community outcomes, which have also 
perpetuated throughout the region. In short, the EAF equity and fairness policy 




unsustainable – the Bruntland (1987) definition is not met and the needs of future 
generations have been compromised.      
 
At face value, this thesis discovered the shortcomings and unintended consequences of 
public fisheries policies. Furthermore, this research exposes the underpinnings which 
have doomed the EAF equity and fairness policies from their inception. Chiefly, the EAF 
equity and fairness policies lack a clear framework to guide managers. There is no 
context for equity – it is hollow to write policies which strive to achieve equity, when 
there is no context of what equity is, how to measure it, and what tools are needed for 
its proper assessment. Moreover, the EAF equity and fairness policies have suffered 
from emphatically slow political processes. Owner-operator and fleet separation policies 
are still not enshrined into legislation, and it has been over 40 years since they werefirst 
introduced as policy statements by Fisheries Minister at the time Romeo LeBlanc.  
Furthermore, there exist conflicting management objectives within the EAF framework 
where equity and fairness policies are often overshadowed by ecological policy goals of 
resource conservation.  
 
The CFRN’s principal objective was to provide Canada, and the world, with a robust 
framework required for the EAF – in order to holistically manage fisheries for the future. 
The framework also includes indicators and attributes which explore distribution and 
equity. However, the CFRN did not define reference points needed to assess equity. 




policy objectives were achieved based on the changing status of distributional 
variability, given the narrow breadth of data and lack of appropriate equity measures.  
 
To the extent that equity is a significant objective, future analyses will need to further 
contemplate and define equity standards and the level of tolerable distributional 
variability. These standards will function as reference points for each indicator – 
thresholds which delineate between the achievement or failure of the policy objectives. 
Future assessments will also require expanding current public and private datasets, 
improving access to public information, and broadening scopes to support the policies. 
Moreover, I echo the literature and call for full participation of all concerned 
stakeholders – there is clear evidence that deep collaboration fosters positive outcomes 
for these initiatives. Lastly, in order to execute future fisheries policy on the road to the 
EAF and sustainability, there is a lot at stake - not only does the success of public policy 
hang in the balance, but more importantly, the future prosperity and resilience of 
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Appendix A: CFRN Evaluation Framework for Sustainable Fisheries  
Table 1. Evaluation Framework for Sustainable Fisheries, Version 2.1: Example Indicators and 
Attributes (Angel et al., 2014)  
 
DOMAIN: Ecological 
DIMENSION ELEMENT INDICATOR 
Productivity Ecological Productivity: 
Fluctuations of species and 
population abundance. 
 [Recruitment Dynamics]6 description for 
[Resource Demographic Category]2 within a 
[Resource Geographic Region]3 
 [Quantification]12  of Fishing Mortality. 
 [Quantification]12  of Escapement and determine 
relationship to [Recruitment Dynamics]6. 
  Geographic Range: 
Fluctuations of species and 
population geographic 
range  
 [Index of Abundance]4  in a [Resource 
Geographic Region]3 during a [Time Period]5 
 [Status]1 of [Resource Demographic Category]2 
within a [Resource Geographic Region]3  
  Phenotypic & Genetic 
Diversity: Fluctuation of 
species and population 
phenotypic and genetic 
diversity 
 [Genetic Diversity]7 and [Phenotypic Diversity]8 
among a [Resource Demographic Category]2  
within a [Resource Geographic Region]3 
 Change in [Genetic Diversity]7 and [Phenotypic 
Diversity]8 among a [Resource Demographic 
Category]2 over  [Time Period]5 
Habitat Substrate Quality: Changes 
to benthic geology and 
geomorphology  
 Proportion of habitat types impacted, and the 
degree of impact, by [Anthropogenic Activity]10  
 Proportion of sensitive [Benthic Species]11 
subject to [Anthropogenic Activity]10 
 Proportion of fishing grounds surveyed and 
mapped  
 Habitat Maps considering presence/absence 
and abundance of [Benthic Species]11 
 [Quantification]12 of [Gear]13 loss  
 [Quantification]12 of [Gear]13 modifications 
applied in a [Fishery Category]14 designed to 
reduce impact to substrate quality 
 Accounting of [Gear]13 
  Water Quality: Changes to 
water quality 
 [Quantification]12 of [Pollution]15 in a [Resource 
Geographic Region]3 
 [Quantification]12 of Anoxic zones in a [Resource 
Geographic Region]3 
 [Eutrophication evidence]19 in a [Resource 
Geographic Region]3 




[Pollution]15  events 
 [Quantification]12 of [Pollution]15 within [Fishery 
Category]14 over [Time Period]5  
Biodiversity Food-web  Persistence: 
Persistence of structure 
and natural resilience of 
the ecosystem 
 [Food-web Interactions]16, including 
[Anthropogenic Activity]10, that 
enhance/maintain [Food-web Stability]17 
 [Quantification]12 of incidental/bycatch 
mortality by [Fishery Category]14 
 [Quantification]12 of [Gear]13 modifications 
applied in a [Fishery Category]14 designed to 
reduce incidental mortality 
 [Biodiversity Indices]9 in a [Resource Geographic 
Region]3  
 Change in [Biodiversity Indices]9  over [Time 
Period]5 
  Non-Native Species: Extent 
and impact of non-native 
species 
 Degree of impact of introduced species on 
[Food-web Stability]17  
 Probability of introduction of new species to 
ecosystem  
 [Quantification]12 of introduced species in 
ecosystem 
 Probability of ability to extirpate introduced 
species, proportional to the degree of impact to 
[Food-web Stability]17 
 [Quantification]12 of extirpation of introduced 
species, proportional to the degree of impact to 
[Food-web Stability]17 
 [Quantification]12 of aquaculture escapes. 
 [Quantification]12 of introduction and 
proliferation of disease/pathogens. 
  Regime Shifts: Risks to 
ecosystem stability due to 
changes in climate 
 [Regime Shift Indicators]18 
 [Quantification]12 of Green House Gas emissions 
 Fuel efficiency of fishing operations in a [Fishery 
Category]14 










DOMAIN: Social and Economic 
DIMENSION ELEMENT INDICATOR 
Health and 
well-being 
Basic needs: Fulfillment of 
basic human needs 
 [Social Factor]20 among [Human Population]21  in 
[Human Geographic Region]22  
 Proportion of [Human Population]21 in [Human 
Geographic Region]22  below the poverty line 
 Income disparity in [Human Geographic 
Region]22  (e.g., Gini coefficient, ratio of highest 
wage to average wage) 
 Availability of affordable [Services]23  to [Human 
Population]21 in [Human Geographic Region]22 
 Ratio of [Services]23  cost to gross adjusted 
disposable income of the household 
 Ranking of the quality of [Education]24 at 
[Human Geographic Region]22 level 
  Food security: Contribution 
to food security  
 [Quantification]12 of [Seafood]25 caught 
[Adjacent]26 to [Human Geographic Region]22 by 
[Product Category]27 
  Food safety: Quality and 
safety of food along the 
supply chain  
 [Quantification]12 of fish and seafood 
establishments regulated for food safety 
 [Quantification]12of fish and seafood regulated 
establishments inspected within the past 5 
years 
 [Quantification]12 of inspected fish and seafood 
regulated establishments in compliance with 
applicable regulations 
 [Quantification]12 of reported cases of food-
borne illness from [Seafood]25 
 Landed value of [Seafood]25  
 Price per lb of [Seafood]25  
 [Quantification]12 of [Seafood]25 by [Processing 
Type]28 
  Occupational safety: 
Workplace health and safety 
conditions  
 [Quantification]12 of deaths at-sea 
 [Quantification]12of injuries in [Fishery 
Category]14 per [Time Period]5  
 Ranking of job safety 
 Proportion of fisheries work force subject to 
Canadian labour laws 
 Proportion of fisheries workforce that meets 
[Certification Standards]29 
  Informed citizenry: Public 
understanding and 
recognition of fisheries  
 Rating of importance of fisheries in opinion 
polls in [Human Geographic Region]22 among 
[Human Population]21 




fisheries dependent communities in [Human 
Geographic Region]22 
 Willingness to pay for [Seafood]25 caught 
[Adjacent]26 to [Human Geographic Region]22 
 [Quantification]12 of [Data]30 readily accessible 
to the public 
 Number of visits to [Fishery Related Website]31 
 The [Organization Condition]32 of community 
events highlighting value of seafood and 
fisheries 
  Vital civic culture: 
Participation and 
engagement in public life  
 The [Organization Condition]32 of 
[Organization]33 in a [Human Geographic 
Region]22 
 Voter turnout in a [Human Geographic 
Region]22 for [Jurisdiction]34 election among 
[Human Population]21 
  Well-being: Quality of life  [Qualitative]35 evidence of subjective 
perception of well-being, applied at [Human 
Geographic Region]22 
 [Well-being Index]36 applied at [Human 
Geographic Region]22Error! Reference source not found. 
Equity and 
Fairness 
Allocation: Fairness in the 
allocation of resource 
benefits 
 [Quantification]12 of reallocations of [Resource 
Demographic Category]2 across [Stakeholder 
Group]38 rights without [Compensation]39 
 Proportion of realized [Compensation]39 relative 
to fair market value of reallocated [Resource 
Demographic Category]2 across [Stakeholder 
Group]38 rights 
 Proportion  of realized allocation relative to 
potential allowed allocation 
 Loss of income from reallocation of access 
rights by [Economic Unit]37 in [Human 
Geographic Region]22 
 [Quantification]12 of [Seafood]25 harvest across 
[Fishery Category]14 being contested by one or 
more [Stakeholder Group]38 
  Stability: Stability of access 
to resource benefits  
 Distribution of catch by [Sector]40Error! Reference 
source not found., [Human Geographic Region]22, 
[Economic Unit]37 
 Distribution of [Access]41 by [Human Geographic 
Region]22, [Human Population]21, [Sector]40, 
[Operator Type]42  
 [Quantification]12 of major changes to 
[Access]41 conditions  over [Time Period]5 
 [Quantification]12 of [Fisheries Related Private 




[Human Geographic Region]22 
  Costs & Benefits: Equitable 
distribution of benefits and 
costs  
 Value of fisheries related [Fisheries Related 
Public Infrastructure]44in [Human Geographic 
Region]22 
 Value of fisheries related [Fisheries Related 
Private Infrastructure]43 in [Human Geographic 
Region]22 
 [Benefit Axis]45 by [Socio-economic distribution 
axis]46 
 [Cost Axis]47 by [Socio-economic distribution 
axis]46 
 Distribution of [Value Type]48 by [Value Chain 
Element]49 
 Distribution of [Value Type]48 by [Operator 
Type]42 
  Risks & Rewards: Equitable 
distribution of risks and 
rewards  
 [Risk Axis]50 by [Socio-economic Distribution 
Axis]46  
  Livelihoods: Sustainability of 
livelihoods  
 [Livelihood Index]51 applied at [Human 
Geographic Region]22 
 Unemployment rate in fishery-dependent 





maintenance of human 
capital  
 [Human Demographic Axis]52 by [Occupational 
Axis]53 
 [Quantification]12 of [Time Period]5 in the 
industry by [Occupational Axis]53 
 [Quantification]12 of generations of fishing 
history of current participants in the fishery 
 [Quantification]12 of fishermen meeting 
[Certification Standards]29  
  Efficiency: Maximization of 
harvest value relative to 
waste  
 Realized catch relative to potential target 
harvest 
 [Quantification]12 of [Resource Demographic 
Category]2 discard waste 
 Market price relative to private marginal cost of 
production 
 Cost of output for [Economic Unit]37 by [Fishery 
Category]14 relative to the lowest possible 
average total cost 
 Output obtained from a given quantity of inputs 
relative to the maximum output obtainable 
from that given quantity of inputs 
 [Productivity]54 of [Economic Unit]37 by [Fishery 
Category]14 





  Financial viability: Financial 
viability of fisheries 
enterprises  
 Net profit of enterprises in [Fishery Category]14 
and by [Gear]13 
 Bankruptcy rate for participants in [Fishery 
Category]14 and by [Gear]13 
 Investment stock/flow in fishery, by [Fishery 
Category]14, [Operator Type]42 and [Gear]13  
 Availability of capital/debt financing by [Fishery 
Category]14, [Operator Type]42 and [Gear]13  
 [Financial ratio]56 by [Fishery Category]14, 
[Operator Type]42 and [Gear]13 
 [Quantification]12 of enterprises dependent on 
one fishery 
 Number of fisheries that fishing enterprises 
participate in 
 Proportion of investment stock/flow in 
depreciating assets versus access [Agreement]57 
by [Operator Type]42Error! Reference source not found. 
  Labour: Sustainability of the 
labour force  
 [Experience]58 and [Education]24 by 
[Occupational Axis]53, [Fishery Category]14 and 
[Gear]13  
 Availability of [Occupational Axis]53 with the 
required [Experience]58 [Education]24 and 
[Certification Standards]29 
 Distribution and mean of [Compensation]39 by 
[Occupational Axis]53 [Fishery Category]14, 
[Gear]13 and [Human Geographic Region]22 
 Unemployment rate in the [Human Geographic 
Region]22 
 Proportion of [Fishery Category]14 and [Gear]13 
subject to [Agreement]57  
 Proportion of [Occupational Axis] labour force 
represented by an industry [Organization]  
 [Quantification]12 of [Labour Tactic]59 
 [Human Demographic Axis]52 by [Occupational 
Axis]53 
  Markets: Health and 
functioning of markets for 
goods, services and capital  
 Availability of [Financial Information]60to [Value 
Chain Element]49 
 Presence/absence of oligopsony or monopsony 
in [Value Chain Element]49 
 % control of each stage of the value chain by 
single entity and by [Value Chain Element]49 
through [Agreement]57  
 Presence/absence of [Legislation/Regulation]61 
to restrict [Market Failure]62 





  Economic sustainability: 
Sustainability of profits at all 
stages of the value chain  
 Economic sustainability index 
 [Financial Information]60 trends 




DIMENSION ELEMENT INDICATOR 
Structure Rules: Legal, regulatory and 
policy framework is appropriate  
  
 Proportion of [Anthropogenic Activity]10 
covered by [Institutional Arrangement]65 and 
subject to [Legislation/Regulation]61 and/or 
[Management Plan]66  
 [Qualitative]35 evidence of support for the 
[Institutional Arrangement]65 and/or 
[Legislation/Regulation]61 and/or 
[Management Plan]66 amongst [Stakeholder 
Group]38  
 [Qualitative]35 evidence of consistency 
between the [Institutional Arrangement]65 
and [Legislation/Regulation]61 and [Human 
Population]21 norms and values 
 [Qualitative]35 evidence of consistency in 
[Institutional Arrangement]65between 
[Stakeholder Group]38  
  Resources: Funding and other 
support is adequate and reliable 
 Level and duration of [Support]67 for 
[General Management Activity]68 and/or 
[Fisheries Management Activity]69 amongst 
[Stakeholder Group]38 and/or [Human 
population]21 at [Human Geographic 
Region]22 
 Types of [Conflict Resolution Approaches]70 
available to deal with disputes 
  Agreements: Agreements 
between participants are 
comprehensive and enforceable  
 [Quantification]12 of agreements involving 
[Stakeholder Group]38 and/or [Human 
Population]21 containing [Agreement 
Element]71  
 [Quantification]12 of agreements involving 
[Stakeholder Group]38 and/or [Human 
Population]21 supported by [Institutional 
Arrangement]65 and/or 
[Legislation/Regulation]61  




relationships within and 
between governments and other 
parties 
Group]38 and [Human Population]21 
perception of collaboration by [Collaboration 
Type]72  
 Degree to which [Collaboration Criteria]73 
exist 
 [Quantification]12 of [Collaboration Criteria]73 
 [Quantification]12 of [Stakeholder Group]38 
participation in [General Management 
Activity]68 and/or [Fisheries Management 
Activity]69  
  Co-operation: Best efforts are 
made to address conflicts 
between stakeholders 
 [Qualitative]35 evidence of [Stakeholder 
Group]38 and [Human Population]21 
perception of co-operation  
 Degree to which [Co-operation Criteria]74 
exist 
 [Quantification]12 of [Co-operation Criteria]74  
  Inclusive: Inclusive processes 
that support participation  
 [Qualitative]35 evidence of [Stakeholder 
Group]38 [Human Population]21 perception of 
inclusivity 
 Degree to which [Inclusivity Criteria]75 exist 
 [Quantification]12 of [Inclusivity Criteria]75 
 [Quantification]12 of [Stakeholder Group]38 
participation in [General Management 
Activity]68 and/or [Fisheries Management 
Activity]69  
  Informed: Stakeholders have 
access to best available 
information and analysis 
 [Qualitative]35 evidence of [Stakeholder 
Group]38 and [Human Population]21 
perception of how well-informed 
participants are 
 Degree to which [Information Standards]76 
exist 
 [Quantification]12 of [Information 
Standards]76 
  Predictable: Predictable and 
consistent decision-making 
procedures that are not changed 
without adequate consultation 
or justification 
 [Qualitative]35 evidence of [Stakeholder 
Group]38 and [Human Population]21 
perception of [Predictability Criteria]77  
 Documentation of [Access]41  
 Documentation and[Quantification]12 of 
changes to [Access]41 
 Existence of [Management Plan]66 
 Documentation and [Quantification]12 of 
changes to [Management Plan]66 
  Flexible: Flexible and responsive 
processes that can be adapted to 
changing circumstances 
 [Qualitative]35 evidence of [Stakeholder 
Group]38 and [Human Population]21 




 Degree to which there is [Flexibility 
Criteria]78 
  Transparent: Open and 
transparent policies, procedures, 
decisions, and supporting 
documentation 
 [Qualitative]35 evidence of [Stakeholder 
Group]38 and [Human Population]21 
perception of transparency  
 Degree to which there is [Transparency 
Criteria]79 [Quantification]12 of [Transparency 
Criteria]79 
Outcomes Compliance: Regular evaluation 
of and reporting on compliance 
with legal, regulatory and policy 
framework 
 [Qualitative]35 evidence of [Stakeholder 
Group]38 and [Human Population]21 
perception of compliance 
 Degree to which there is [Compliance 
Criteria]80  
 [Quantification]12 of [Compliance Criteria]80  
  Power dynamics: Explicit 
consideration of power dynamics 
in decision-making 
 [Qualitative]35evidence of [Stakeholder 
Group]38 and [Human Population]21 
perception of power dynamics 
 Degree to which [Power Dynamics Criteria]81 
are identified and addressed 
  Appropriateness: Explicit 
consideration of constitutional, 
collective, and operational levels 
in decision-making 
 [Qualitative]35 evidence of [Stakeholder 
Group]38 and [Human Population]21 
perception of appropriateness  
 Presence/absence of role for [Stakeholder 
Group]38 in the development, establishment 
and enforcement of rules at the [Rule 
Level]82 
 Degree to which [Accredited Organization 
Criteria]83 was consulted in the development, 
establishment and enforcement of rules at 
the [Rule Level]82 
 Degree to which [Stakeholder Group]38 role 
in the development, establishment and 
enforcement of rules at the [Rule Level]82 is 
commensurate with impact of rule on the 
[Stakeholder Group]38 
 Degree to which there is [Flexibility 
Criteria]78 
  Trade-offs: Explicit consideration 
of trade-offs in decision-making 
 [Qualitative]35 evidence of [Stakeholder 
Group]38 and [Human Population]21 
perception of trade-off  
 Degree to which [Trade-off Criteria]84 are 
identified and implemented 
 [Quantification]12 of [Trade-off Criteria]84  
  Assessment: Regular evaluation 
of and reporting on outcomes in 
 [Qualitative]35 evidence of [Stakeholder 




the ecological, community, and 
institutional dimensions of the 
fishery 
perception of assessment  
 [Quantification]12 of [Fishery Category]14 
subject to assessment 
 Degree to which [Assessment Method]85 
exists 
 [Quantification]12 of recommendations from 




1. Status: Bt/Btarget; Bt/Blim; Bt/B0; Probability of Extinction; COSEWIC/SARA 
designated unit status 
2. Resource Demographic Category: species; population; stock; size; sex; age class 
3. Resource Geographic Region: province; country; Exclusive Economic Zone; region; 
management area; marine area; river system; lake; watershed 
4. Index of Abundance: CPUE; WPUE; survey estimates; stock assessment biomass/abundance 
estimates 
5. Time Period: day; week, month; season; year; decade; century 
6. Recruitment Dynamics: compensation or depensation; changes in average recruitment 
7. Genetic Diversity: genetic variation using microsatellites and mitochondrial DNA; genetic 
mixing; genetic sex ratio 
8. Phenotypic Diversity: phenotypic variation in measurable characteristics; maturation-at-
age;  size-at-age; phenotypic sex ratio 
9. Biodiversity Indices: species richness; Shannon’s diversity; species assemblage structure  
10. Anthropogenic Activity: harvesting; shipping; tourism and recreation; oil and gas 
extraction/processing; mining; forestry; aquaculture; construction; residential development 
11. Benthic Species: corals; sponge; crystalline algae 
12. Quantification: proportion; number; frequency; total area; total volume; presence/absence; 
ratio 
13. Gear: nets; traps; hooks; longline; trawl; troll; gillnet; seine; trap; hook and line; dive 
14. Fishery Category: fishery (by species, gear, market); fleet (by vessel size, ownership, gear) 
15. Pollution: thermal & heated water; sewage; debris; oil discharge; noise; light 
16. Food-web Interactions: Interaction Strength; Metabolic Respiration; energy flow; carbon 
flow 
17. Food-web Stability: CV of biomass; Eigenvalue from Community Matrix Interactions. 
18. Regime Shift Indicators: CV of biomass; Average Trophic Level; Length of fish; End-to-End 
Ecosystem Models; Ecosystem Exploitation Index 
19. Eutrophication evidence: nutrient concentrations; hypoxia; algal blooms; changes 
phytoplankton communities; fish kills. 
20. Social Factor: suicide rate; infant mortality rate; unemployment rate; migration rate; 
employment rate; life expectancy; real per capita income; job satisfaction level employment 
rate; life expectancy; real per capita income; job satisfaction level 
21. Human Population: general human population; fisheries participants; aboriginal people; 
youth; women; coastal communities 




23. Services: education; housing; daycare; medical care 
24. Education: primary school, some high school; high school graduate; some postsecondary; 
postsecondary certificate or diploma; bachelor’s degree; master’s degree; PhD 
25. Seafood: by species grouping (e.g., salmon, groundfish); species (e.g., chum salmon, 
prawns); gear and species (e.g., gillnet-caught chum salmon)  
26. Adjacent: within 10 miles; within 100 miles; in province; in country  
27. Product Category: landed; processed; available for sale; consumed; exported from 
28. Processing Type: fresh; fresh-frozen; frozen-at-sea; smoked; fish product (e.g., surimi); 
canned; fishmeal 
29. Certification Standards: occupational first aid; marine emergency duties; master’s ticket; 
engineer’s ticket 
30. Data: federal fisheries data that does not violate privacy, confidentiality or national security 
requirements; federal fisheries catch data; federal; fisheries stock assessment data; federal 
fisheries quota transaction data; provincial fisheries processing data; fisheries ownership 
data 
31. Fishery Related Website: DFO website; industry association website; community association 
fisheries website; ENGO fisheries website  
32. Organization Condition: number of; participation rates in; funding for 
33. Organization: arts organizations; cultural institutions; social organizations; environmental 
organizations; political organizations; industry associations 
34. Jurisdiction: federal; provincial; municipal; First Nation 
35. Qualitative: survey; focus group; interview; public hearing; public inquiry; study; legal 
proceedings; media article 
36. Well-being Index: OECD Better Life Index; Genuine Progress Index; Gross National 
Happiness; Human Development Index 
37. Economic Unit: Individual; enterprise; fishery; industry 
38. Stakeholder Group: Aboriginal communities; Industry; Resource Users; Regional 
government; Community groups; Environmental interests; Provincial Government 
39. Compensation: payment; wage; share; bonus 
40. Sector: commercial; recreational; food; cultural 
41. Access: open access; license; quota; individual property right; hereditary right; communal 
property right 
42. Operator Type: processor with fisheries access rights; non-participating access owner 
(investor); owner-operator; active fishermen without ownership access  
43. Fisheries Related Private Infrastructure: vessels; processing plants; service providers; 
manufacturers 
44. Fisheries Related Public Infrastructure: wharves, docks, piers; coast guard facilities; 
research stations and vessels; stock enhancement facilities 
45. Benefit Axis: employment; access (quota, license); physical capital (e.g., vessels); income; 
revenue; food; opportunity 
46. Socio-economic Distribution Axis: gender; age; sector; fishery; region; community; 
enterprise; vessel; harvester; individual 
47. Cost Axis: loss of capital; loss of human life; human health impacts; habitat loss; ecosystem 
service losses; opportunity costs; foregone revenues 
48. Value Type: landed value; export value; wholesale value; retail value 
49. Value Chain Element: producer; processor; wholesaler; retailer; consumer; investor 
50. Risk Axis: ecological; financial; economic; health; cultural 




52. Human Demographic Axis: age; sex; place of residence; aboriginal status; education; income 
level  
53. Occupational Axis: skipper; deckhand; tenderman; diver; shoreworker; technician; fisheries 
observer; fisheries scientist; processor; fisheries manager; fisheries researcher  
54. Productivity: labour productivity; multi-factor productivity; capital productivity 
55. Efficiency: allocative efficiency; productive efficiency; technical efficiency 
56. Financial ratio: cash ratio; current ratio; effective tax rate; return on equity; debt to equity; 
cash flow to debt; price/earnings ratio; dividend yield 
57. Agreement: conditional sales agreement; trust agreement; minimum price agreement; 
collective agreement 
58. Experience: months or years working in industry; position (deckhand, skipper); fisheries 
59. Labour tactic: strike; blacklist; boycott 
60. Financial Information: license value; quota value; share value; wages; price; revenues; costs; 
profits; stock status 
61. Legislation/Regulation: Fisheries Act; Oceans Act; Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) 
requirements; industry association regulations 
62. Market Failure: corporate concentration; insider trading; undue market control; transfer 
pricing; price gouging; price-fixing 
63. Enforcement: arrest, prosecution, fine, jail term 
64. Economic Variables: price; rent; subsidies; externalities; consumer surplus; producer surplus 
65. Institutional Arrangement: legislation; regulation; policy; programs; management structures 
66. Management Plan: IFMP; marine use plan; land use plan 
67. Support: financial; human resources; technical; logistical 
68. General Management Activity: planning; policy-making; data collection; research and 
analysis; decision-making; audit and evaluation; training; administration; communications 
69. Fisheries Management Activity: monitoring; enforcement; stock assessment; research; 
habitat monitoring; habitat protection; habitat restoration; habitat enhancement; harvest 
planning; harvest management 
70. Conflict Resolution Approaches: Facilitative approach; Mediation; Negotiation; Arbitration; 
Rights based Court system; Rule based processes; Transformative approach; Interest based 
approach; Evaluative approach; Activist approach; Narrative approach 
71. Agreement Element: goals & objectives; terms of reference; statement of roles and 
responsibilities; duration and renewal conditions; liability and accountability provisions; 
dispute resolution mechanisms; audit and evaluation conditions 
72. Collaboration Type: public-private partnerships; private-social partnerships; co-
management 
73. Collaboration Criteria: power-sharing; information-sharing; shared rule-making; multi-party 
agreements signed and/or renewed; multi-party management plans 
74. Co-operation Criteria: disputed decisions; disputes resolved; availability of third party 
conflict resolution services; use of third party conflict resolution services; ministerial 
intervention 
75. Inclusivity Criteria: access to funding; access to other resources; attendance at meetings; 
participation rates at public hearings; travel time between fishing communities & meeting 
locations; membership in stakeholder groups 
76. Information Standards: allocation decisions include explicit trade-off analysis; decisions 
include risk assessment; peer review of science; knowledge of legal and regulatory 
framework; indicators are SMART; use of EBM approaches; application of Precautionary 




Bayesian Decision Networks 
77. Predictability Criteria: clearly established and communicated processes for decision making; 
following plain meaning of a process or provision; pursue process as it was intended by 
drafters; follow precedent 
78. Flexibility Criteria: adherence to process and precedent; consideration of range, time, 
change, conditions of uncertainty and favourability; consideration of trigger events, trigger 
states, decisions and choices; distinguish between flexible, inflexible and degrees of 
flexibility 
79. Transparency Criteria: availability of information; usability of available information; public 
release of rationale for decision 
80. Compliance Criteria: conformation to rules, regulations, plans, policies, standards, 
agreements, laws and administrative specifications; requirement of and conformity to 
covenants of permits, certificates, licenses or leases; penalties in place to address infractions 
such as fines, seizure of harvest 
81. Power Dynamics Criteria: sources of power imbalances (personal, relational, data, 
technological, professional, structural, educational, capacity etc.); types of power relations 
(citizen, delegated or power over, partnership or power with, powerless, empowered, 
coercive, cooperative); power holders  
82. Rule Level: constitutional level; collective level; operational level  
83. Accredited Organization Criteria: represents members; requires members to pay an annual 
due; maintains a duly elected executive; has established and maintains a reporting 
mechanism; has made required filings and registration with appropriate public bodies; 
maintains minimum membership size 
84. Trade-off Criteria: qualitative and quantitative frameworks to discuss trade-offs; clarified 
decision context; clear statement of and justification for trade-offs; evaluation and selection 
of trade-offs; assignment of ranks or preferences for alternatives; estimation of risk 
(objective and subjective) 
85. Assessment Method: performance-based audit; program evaluation; fishery management 
plan evaluation; third-party fisheries certification assessment; management strategy 
evaluation; CFRN indicator framework 












Appendix B - Semi-Structured Survey Questions 
 
Interview Questions (22): Semi-structured face-to-face key informant interview.  
(Attention: You may skip any question you are not willing to answer without penalty)  
 
The author repeated all questions for each participant within all fisheries examined  
 
1. Can you please tell me about your history with the fishery? 
a. What is your status within the harvesting sector? 
b. When did you start working? 
c. For how many years? 
 
2. Were there any changes during your involvement with the fishery? 
a. Reduction, loss, or gain in landed value? 
b. Reduction, loss, or gain of ownership of license(s), and/or quota? 
c. Loss or gain in the number of vessels you owned or within the community (if 
applicable)? 
d. Reduction, loss, or gain of employment? 
e. Reduction, loss, or gain of income? 
 
3. What are some of the current rules (regulation, legislation, policy, and management 
measures) for the fishery? 
a. Have these changed over the years? 
b. If yes, how so? 
c. In your opinion, have these regulations changed your (or others) employment, 
income, share of revenue, or ownership (licenses and number of vessels)? 
d. If yes to any, please explain in detail.   
 
 
4. What is your perception of: a) how have the overall distribution of benefits changed 
within the fishery in Grand Manan, NB, b) how have the overall distribution of 
benefits changed between communities in the region for this fishery, and c) how 
have the overall distribution of benefits changed between individual harvesters (e.g. 
owner, captain, officers, cook, crew, and between men and women) in Grand Manan, 
NB, for this fishery? 
a. In your opinion, which groups are benefiting the most from the fishery? 
b. In your opinion, which groups are benefiting the least from the fishery? 
c. Please compare how benefits are shared between individuals of this harvesting 




d. How have the benefits that you have received from the fisheries changed over the 
years (1960’s – 2014) in comparison to other individuals within this harvesting 
sector? 
e. How has the distribution of fishing benefits changed over the years (1960’s-2014) in 
Grand Manan, NB, compared to other communities within the Maritimes Region? 
i. For example: what is the % employment in Grand Manan, NB (for this fishery), how 
has this changed over the years, and how does this compare to the changes in % 
employment (for this fishery) within the Maritimes Region of Atlantic Canada, over 
the years (1960’s – 2014)? 
 
Table 10. List of indicators developed to measure the distribution of community fishing benefits.  
 
Landed Value  
Number of Licenses (Change in Access)  










































Year Herring Groundfish Lobster Total
1998 10 12 133 155
1999 11 10 133 154
2000 11 10 131 152
2001 10 9 128 147
2002 9 9 128 146
2003 9 9 128 146
2004 7 9 124 140
2005 7 9 138 154
2006 7 9 131 147
2007 7 9 146 162
2008 9 132 141
2009 9 124 133
2010 7 122 129
2011 7 122 129











Year Herring Groundfish (cod)Lobster






1985 1,890,437.77 98,626.14 4,885,939.19
1986 415,726.95 183,210.57 5,188,890.73
1987 597,219.23 5,752,801.04
1988 200,090.69 529,997.12 6,719,220.93
1989 215,878.99 315,445.39 5,124,721.07
1990 184,700.04 245,610.84 5,160,354.62
1991 170,530.43 5,511,269.32





































33 34 38 38 Comm 35 36 38B
1998 728 981 133 2 96 178
1999 723 979 133 3 96 177
2000 717 981 131 6 94 177
2001 712 971 128 9 93 177
2002 710 965 128 9 93 176
2003 708 964 128 9 92 174
2004 706 958 124 13 88 171
2005 703 953 121 16 86 170 17
2006 703 955 121 16 85 168 10
2007 702 953 121 16 85 168 25
2008 691 953 121 16 85 167 11
2009 677 952 112 16 85 165 12
2010 670 941 109 16 85 164 13
2011 660 936 106 16 85 162 16
2012 653 929 106 16 85 162 17
2013 644 923 104 16 85 159 23














Year 33 34 35 36 38 & 38B Total
1979 6,636,239 55,086,175 1,990,829 2,728,098 5,135,125 71,576,466.04
1980 4,859,186 55,244,893 1,287,938 2,829,490 3,950,468 68,171,975.94
1981 5,747,880 54,907,871 1,953,657 2,501,081 5,684,997 70,795,486.08
1982 7,151,084 60,716,267 2,158,204 3,398,963 6,193,478 79,617,995.98
1983 11,951,626 75,504,321 1,948,013 3,153,287 5,552,136 98,109,383.81
1984 22,660,825 89,808,018 3,419,460 3,664,252 6,026,190 125,578,745.01
1985 31,724,479 90,812,814 3,808,426 4,846,564 4,885,939 136,078,222.61
1986 45,705,568 126,649,115 4,721,483 4,677,529 5,188,891 186,942,584.43
1987 45,415,487 135,807,480 5,999,994 5,583,939 5,761,377 198,568,277.05
1988 30,302,490 115,887,391 4,208,723 4,577,850 6,714,012 161,690,465.74
1989 25,682,385 111,001,928 3,816,504 2,836,927 5,124,722 148,462,464.63
1990 24,478,568 114,427,589 2,997,100 2,939,523 5,160,354 150,003,133.85
1991 26,236,932 118,863,716 3,274,178 2,815,576 5,511,269 156,701,670.74
1992 21,923,402 121,793,017 3,428,783 2,773,793 5,811,180 155,730,176.24
1993 23,892,822 119,982,153 2,938,012 2,894,803 5,975,451 155,683,240.08
1994 23,103,639 153,844,954 4,643,697 4,145,964 8,150,177 193,888,432.54
1995 28,838,487 164,097,491 6,807,608 4,887,653 9,774,335 214,405,573.52
1996 27725426.29 167133652.6 11117921.66 9435102.978 8570173.146 223,982,276.66
1997 27,691,062 175,314,667 13,425,737 9,560,542 9,408,141 235,400,149.49
1998 33,263,538 197,717,476 13,230,951 11,820,242 11,399,574 267,431,780.97
1999 40,599,863 260,974,123 16,909,631 15,570,346 15,802,329 349,856,292.76
2000 37,259,700 241,498,850 17,336,561 14,626,471 14,090,610 324,812,191.14
2001 42,850,604 297,314,874 20,062,933 17,824,612 16,819,481 394,872,503.32
2002 36,567,678 300,367,189 21,853,860 19,060,999 18,039,363 395,889,088.57
2003 39,494,546 310,469,430 20,134,283 18,684,759 17,067,744 405,850,761.71
2004 32,894,977 263,160,485 18,246,970 16,027,581 15,550,694 345,880,705.89
2005 44,257,629 300,488,888 21,069,757 20,194,183 25,632,119 411,642,575.17
2006 39,618,404 246,066,050 19,839,593 15,694,186 21,746,216 342,964,449.81
2007 34,718,352 200,361,496 16,622,210 13,720,379 18,512,858 283,935,295.08
2008 33,912,754 210,983,798 17,252,342 15,380,059 20,458,582 297,987,535.14
2009 32,096,451 186,333,315 18,081,104 15,369,822 18,387,197 270,267,888.02
2010 37,143,383 210,212,240 23,527,213 16,446,988 21,730,096 309,059,920.33














1998 68 38 12 213 0 28 359
1999 67 37 12 202 0 28 346
2000 63 36 10 186 0 26 321
2001 66 37 10 182 0 31 326
2002 67 37 9 174 0 32 319
2003 64 35 9 170 0 31 309
2004 63 35 9 165 0 34 306
2005 64 35 9 171 0 27 306
2006 64 36 9 168 0 27 304
2007 63 36 9 174 0 20 302
2008 70 35 9 165 0 23 302
2009 63 43 9 160 0 23 298
2010 66 44 9 154 0 24 297
2011 70 43 7 144 0 33 297
2012 75 41 7 138 0 33 294
2013 78 42 7 131 0 35 293
